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The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be
"too responsive" is a political climate in which judges who covet
higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly
profess their fealty to the death penalty .... The danger that they will
bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publi-
cized capital cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden
to King George III.
-Justice John Paul Stevens,
dissenting in Harris v. Alabama'
The thunderous voice of the present-day "higher authority" that Justice
Stevens described is heard today with unmistakable clarity in the courts
throughout the United States. Those judges who do not listen and bend
to political pressures may lose their positions on the bench.
Decisions in capital cases have increasingly become campaign fodder in
both judicial and nonjudicial elections. The focus in these campaigns has
been almost entirely on the gruesome facts of particular murders, not the
reason for the judicial decisions. Judges have come under attack and
have been removed from the bench for their decisions in capital cases-
with perhaps the most notable examples in states with some of the largest
death rows and where the death penalty has been a dominant political
issue. Recent challenges to state court judges in both direct and retention
elections have made it clear that unpopular decisions in capital cases,
even when clearly compelled by law, may cost a judge her seat on the
bench, or promotion to a higher court. This raises serious questions
about the independence and integrity of the judiciary and the ability of
judges to enforce the Bill of Rights and otherwise be fair and impartial in
capital cases.
California has the largest death row of any state in the nation.2 In
1986, Governor George Deukmejian publicly warned two justices of the
state's supreme court that he would oppose them in their retention elec-
tions unless they voted to uphold more death sentences.' He had already
announced his opposition to Chief Justice Rose Bird because of her votes
in capital cases.4 Apparently unsatisfied with the subsequent votes of the
other two justices, the governor carried out his threat.' He opposed the
1 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
2 NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row, USA 13 (Spring 1995)
(fact sheet on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Death Row,
USA] (cataloguing the 407 persons on California's death row as of April 30, 1995).
3 Steve Wiegand, Governor's Warning to 2 Justices, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 1986, at
1.
4 Leo C. Wolinsky, Governor's Support for 2 Justices Tied to Death Penalty Votes,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1986, at 3.
5 Henry Unger, Will Vote Against Grodin, Reynoso, Deukmejian Says, L.A. DAILY
J., Aug. 26, 1986, at 1.
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retention of all three justices and all lost their seats after a campaign
dominated by the death penalty.6 Deukmejian appointed their replace-
ments in 1987.
The removal and replacement of the three justices has affected every
capital case the court has subsequently reviewed, resulting in a dramatic
change. In the last five years, the Court has affirmed nearly 97% of the
capital cases it has reviewed, one of the highest rates in the nation.7 A
law professor who watches the court observed, "One thing it shows is that
when the voters speak loudly enough, even the judiciary listens."' The
once highly regarded court now distinguishes itself primarily by its readi-
ness to find trial court error harmless in capital cases. The new court has
"reversed every premise underlying the Bird Court's harmless error anal-
ysis," displaying an eagerness that reflects "jurisprudential theory" less
than a "desire to carry out the death penalty."9
The voice of "higher authority" has also been heard and felt in Texas,
which has the nation's second largest death row.' 0 After a decision by the
state's highest criminal court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, reversing
the conviction in a particularly notorious capital case, a former chairman
of the state Republican Party called for Republicans to take over the
court in the 1994 election." The voters responded to the call. Republi-
6 Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1986, pt. 1, at 1 (describing how Rose Bird's "box score" of 61 reversal votes in 61
capital cases became a "constant refrain of the campaign against her," and how cam-
paign commercials against the other two justices in the last month of the race insisted
"that all three justices needed to lose if the death penalty is to be enforced"); see also
Philip Hager, Grodin Says He Was "Caught" in Deukmajian's Anti-Bird Tide, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1986, pt. 1, at 3 (quoting defeated Justice Joseph R. Grodin saying
that he was defeated in a "tide of opposition to the chief justice and frustration over
the death penalty").
7 Maura Dolan, State High Court Is Strong Enforcer of Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Dolan, State High Court Is Strong Enforcer of Death
Penalty]; see also Maura Dolan, State High Court Steering a Pragmatic Legal Course,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at A5 (describing the court's high rate of death-sentence
affirmation in mandatory review cases).
8 Dolan, State High Court Is Strong Enforcer of Death Penalty, supra note 7, at Al
(quoting Professor Clark Kelso).
9 Elliot C. Kessler, Death and Harmlessness: Application of the Harmless Error
Rule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases-A Comparison & Cri-
tique, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 41, 85, 89 (1991).
10 Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 2, at 9, 36 (stating that Texas had carried out 93
executions between the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976 and April 30,
1995, and that 398 people remained on death row awaiting execution).
"1 Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; His Past
Isn't What It Seems, Tux. LAw., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1, 32. The case was Rodriguez v.
State, 848 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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cans won every position they sought on the court.12
One of the Republicans elected to the court was Stephen W. Mansfield,
who had been a member of the Texas bar only two years, but campaigned
for the court on promises of the death penalty for killers, greater use of
the harmless-error doctrine, and sanctions for attorneys who file "frivo-
lous appeals especially in death penalty cases."'" Even before the elec-
tion it came to light that Mansfield had misrepresented his prior
background, experience, and record,' 4 that he had been fined for practic-
ing law without a license in Florida, 5 and that-contrary to his assertions
that he had experience in criminal cases and had "written extensively on
criminal and civil justice issues"-he had virtually no experience in crimi-
nal law and his writing in the area of criminal law consisted of a guest
column in a local newspaper criticizing the same decision that prompted
the former Republican chairman to call for a takeover of the court.'6
Nevertheless, Mansfield defeated the incumbent judge, a conservative
former prosecutor who had served twelve years on the court and was
supported by both sides of the criminal bar.1 7 Mansfield was sworn in to
office for a six-year term in January 1995.18 Among his responsibilities
12 John Williams, Election '94: GOP Gains Majority in State Supreme Court,
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at A29.
'3 Elliott & Connelly, supra note 11, at 32.
14 Id. Before the election, Mansfield admitted lying about his birthplace (he
claimed to be born in Texas, but was born in Massachusetts), the amount of time he
had spent in Texas, and his prior political experience. Id.; Jane Elliott, Unqualified
Success: Mansfield's Mandate; Vote Makes a Case for Merit Selection, TEX. LAW., Nov.
14, 1994, at 1 (reporting that Mansfield was unable to verify campaign claims regard-
ing the number of criminal cases he had handled and had portrayed himself as a polit-
ical novice despite having twice unsuccessfully run for Congress); see also Do It Now,
FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 12, 1994, at 32 (editorial calling for reform of the
judicial selection system in Texas and for an immediate challenge to Mansfield's elec-
tion because he had "shaded the truth of virtually every aspect of his career"); Q & A
with Stephen Mansfield; 'The Greatest Challenge of My Life,' TEX. LAW., Nov. 21,
1994, at 8 (printing a post-election interview with Mansfield in which he "retracts" a
number of statements made before and during the interview). Also discovered after
the election was Mansfield's failure to report $10,000 in past-due child support when
he applied for his Texas law license in 1992. Child Support Allegations Threaten
Judge Seat, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 10, 1994, at 29.
1r Williams, supra note 12, at A29.
16 Elliott & Connelly, supra note 11, at 32. Mansfield received the support of vic-
tims' rights groups. Id.
17 Elliott, supra note 14, at 1. Mansfield won 54% of the vote in the general elec-
tion; his opponent, Judge Charles F. Campbell, received 46%. Id. Mansfield had
previously won the Republican nomination for the seat, winning 67% of the primary
vote in defeating John Cossum, a former state and federal prosecutor who was work-
ing as a criminal defense lawyer in Houston. Elliott & Connelly, supra note 11, at 32.
18 Robert Elder, Jr., The Conservative Era Begins: Mansfield, Keller, Owen Join
High Courts, TEX. LAW., Jan. 9, 1995, at 1.
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will be the review of every capital case coming before the court on direct
appeal and in postconviction review.
The single county in America responsible for the most death sentences
and executions is Harris County, Texas, which includes Houston.1 9 Judge
Norman E. Lanford, a Republican, was voted off the state district court in
Houston in 1992 after he recommended in postconviction proceedings
that a death sentence be set aside due to prosecutorial misconduct, and
directed an acquittal in another murder case due to constitutional viola-
tions.2 0 A prosecutor who specialized in death cases, Caprice Cosper,
defeated Judge Lanford in the Republican primary.21 Lanford accused
District Attorney John B. Holmes of causing congestion of Lanford's
docket to help bring about his defeat.2 2 In the November election, Cos-
per was elected after a campaign in which radio advertisements on her
behalf attacked her Democratic opponent for having once opposed the
death penalty.'
Judges in other states have had similar campaigns waged against them.
Justice James Robertson was voted off the Mississippi Supreme Court in
1992. His opponent in the Democratic primary ran as a "law and order
19 By the end of February 1995, 37 persons sentenced to death in Harris County
had been executed. Tamar Lewin, Who Decides Who Will Die? Even Within States It
Varies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, at Al, A13. Another 114 persons sentenced to
death in Harris County are awaiting execution on Texas' death row. Barry Sclachter,
Texas' Execution Record Defies Sole Answer, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 12,
1995, at A10 ("Death sentences from courts in Houston's county, Harris, alone have
accounted for more executions than the second-ranking state, Florida. It now has 114
inmates on death row."). Only 11 states besides Texas have over 100 persons under
death sentence. Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 2, at 10-41.
20 Lanford became the center of controversy after he ruled that there had been an
illegal arrest and ordered the acquittal of a man accused of killing a police officer.
Barbara Linkin, Controversial Judge Lanford to Leave Bench, HOUSTON PosT, June
13, 1992, at A-25. Lanford was also criticized for sentencing a man convicted of child
abuse to "10 years deferred adjudication." Critics said that Lanford should have sen-
tenced the man more severely, but Lanford stated that the sentence was the result of
a plea bargain that the prosecutor had developed. Network Affiliates Feature Bush
Interview, HOUSTON PosT, Mar. 10, 1992, at A-13.
21 Criminal Court Races Northcutt, Cosper, 4 Incumbents Deserve to Win, Hous-
TON POST, Oct. 24, 1992, at A-28; District Judge, Criminal Courts, HoUsToN CHRON.,
Oct. 25, 1992, at 11. Cosper was Harris County's chief appellate prosecutor in post-
conviction capital litigation prior to running for judge.
22 The Texas Lawyer reported that "[c]ourthouse records, which show a dramatic
increase in the number of cases on Lanford's docket in the months prior to the March
10 primary, lend credence to his claim that prosecutors stalled cases in a calculated
effort to provide ammunition for the judge's opponent." Mark Ballard, Gunning for a
Judge; Houston's Lanford Blames DA 's Office for His Downfall, TEx. LAW., Apr. 13,
1992, at 1.
23 Alan Bernstein, Campaign Briefs, HoUsToN CHRON., Oct. 26, 1992, at A14.
1995]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:759
candidate" with the support of the Mississippi Prosecutors Association.24
Among the decisions for which Robertson's opponent attacked him was a
concurring opinion expressing the view that the Constitution did not per-
mit the death penalty for rape where there was no loss of life.2 5 Robert-
son's opponent exploited the opinion even though the U.S. Supreme
Court had held ten years earlier that the Eighth Amendment did not per-
mit the death penalty in such cases. 26 Opponents also attacked Robert-
son for his dissenting opinions in two cases that the U.S. Supreme Court
later reversed.27
Robertson was the second justice to be voted off the court in two years
for being "soft on crime." Joel Blass, whom the Governor had appointed
to fill an unexpired term on the court, was defeated in 1990 for a full term
by a candidate who promised to be a "tough judge for tough times" and
to put criminals behind bars, and whom, like Justice Robertson's oppo-
nent, the Mississippi Prosecutors Association had endorsed.' Justice
24 David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial
Elections in Mississippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 15-20 (1992); Death Penalty Caused
Judge's Fall, Critics Say, GREENWOOD COMMONWEALTH (Miss.), Mar. 13, 1992, at 3;
Incumbent Robertson Defeated, GREENWOOD COMMONWEALTH (Miss.), Mar. 11,
1992, at 1; Carole Lawes & Beverly Kraft, High Court Judge Coddled Criminals, Crit-
ics Say, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 13, 1992, at lB. The resolution of
the prosecutors association asserted that Robertson's opponent "best represents the
views of the law abiding citizens" and "will give the crime victims and the good, hon-
est and law abiding people of this state a hearing that is at least as fair as that of the
criminal in child abuse, death penalty, and other serious criminal cases." Case, supra,
at 16 n.108.
25 Court's Ruling Morally Repugnant, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), July 2,
1989, reprinted in On March 10, Vote for Judge James L. Roberts, Jr. for the Mississippi
Supreme Court, N.E. Miss. DAILY J., Mar. 7, 1992, Campaign Supp. at 6. The case
was Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 403-06 (Miss. 1989) (Robertson, J., concur-
ring) (expressing the view that there was "as much chance of the Supreme Court
sanctioning death as a penalty for any non-fatal rape as the proverbial snowball
enjoys in the nether regions").
26 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
27 Case, supra note 24; see Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 101 (Miss. 1988) (Rob-
ertson, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990);
Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1367 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J. dissenting), rev'd
sub nom. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). Robertson's views were dis-
torted in the campaign. Although in his dissenting opinion in Clemons Robertson
had expressed the view that the trial court's instruction on the "heinous, atrocious or
cruel" aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague, id. at 1367-68 (Robertson, J.,
dissenting), a circular distributed during the campaign described his decision as
"believing a defendant who 'shot an unarmed pizza delivery boy in cold-blood' had
not committed a crime serious enough to warrant the death penalty." Case, supra
note 24, at 18.
28 Tammie Cessna Langford, 7wo Vying for State's High Court, SUN HERALD
(Biloxi, Miss.), June 3, 1990, at B-1.
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Blass expressed concern during the campaign that his opponent was mis-
leading the public, explaining: "Neither a Supreme Court judge nor the
whole court can send a person to prison. '
The voice of "higher authority" can also be heard in less direct, but
equally compelling ways. As Justice Stevens observed in his dissent in
Harris v. Alabama, some members of the United States Senate have
"made the death penalty a litmus test in judicial confirmation hearings"
for nominees to the federal bench.30 Several challengers for Senate seats
in the 1994 elections "routinely savaged their incumbent opponents for
supporting federal judicial nominees perceived to be 'soft' on capital
punishment."'"
It is becoming increasingly apparent that these political pressures have
a significant impact on the fairness and integrity of capital trials. When
presiding over a highly publicized capital case, a judge who declines to
hand down a sentence of death, or who insists on upholding the Bill of
Rights, may thereby sign his own political death warrant.3 2 In such cir-
cumstances, state court judges who desire to remain in office are no more
able to protect the rights of an accused in a criminal case than elected
judges have been to protect the civil rights of racial minorities against
29 Id. at B-5. Blass also raised the question of whether his opponent violated the
canons of judicial ethics by promising to be tough on criminals. "The Supreme Court
has the constitutional duty to see to it that every defendant gets a fair trial. It is not a
question of guilt or innocence at that point, but a question of due process," Blass said.
Id. Blass was handily defeated by an opponent who was not so constrained in his
comments and who spent $114,913, compared to Blass's $48,533, in campaigning for a
position that pays only $75,800 per year. Id.; see also Andy Kanenglser, McRae Over-
whelms Justice Joel Blass, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 6, 1990, at 4A;
Tammie Cessna Langford, McRae Unseats Blass, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), June 3,
1990, at A-1.
30 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 n.5 (1995) (dissenting opinion).
31 Id.; see also Neal A. Lewis, GOP to Challenge Judicial Nominees Who Oppose
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A26 ("Senate Republicans have given
notice that they will challenge any ... judicial nominees they consider insufficiently
committed to the death penalty.").
32 A classic example was provided in the case of the "Scottsboro Boys," the Afri-
can-American youths sentenced to death for rape in Scottsboro, Alabama, whose con-
victions and sentences were twice reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 287 (1935) (reversing because of racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 32 (1932) (reversing because of denial of counsel
to the accused). Alabama Circuit Judge James Edwin Horton granted the defendants
a new trial in 1933 and was voted out of office the next year, ending his judicial and
political career. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOuTH 265-73 (rev. ed. 1992). Horton had encountered no opposition when he ran
for the judgeship four years earlier. Id. at 273. In the same election that saw Judge
Horton voted out of office, the state's attorney general, who had personally prose-
cuted the Scottsboro defendants, was elected lieutenant governor. Id
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majority sentiment."3 As Justice Stevens observed, "Not surprisingly,
given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than
juries to impose the death penalty." 4 In the three states that permit
elected judges to override jury sentences in capital cases, 5 judges over-
ride jury sentences of life imprisonment and impose death far more often
than they override death sentences and impose life imprisonment.3 6
Judges have also failed to enforce constitutional guarantees of fairness. It
has been observed that "[t]he more susceptible judges are to political
challenge, the less likely they are to reverse a death penalty judgment.""7
Affirmance rates over a ten-year period suggest that "[n]ationaly there is
a close correlation between the method of selection of a state supreme
court and that court's affirmance rate in death penalty appeals."38 Even
greater pressure exists at the local level. Elected trial judges are under
considerable pressure not to suppress evidence, grant a change of venue,
or protect other constitutional rights of the accused. An indigent defend-
ant may face the death penalty at trial without one of the most fundamen-
tal protections of the Constitution, a competent lawyer, because judges
frequently appoint inexperienced, uncaring, incompetent, or inadequately
compensated attorneys.3 9 State trial court judges in many states routinely
dispose of complex legal and factual issues in capital postconviction pro-
ceedings by adopting "orders" ghostwritten by state attorneys general-
33 See, e.g., JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM; THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 159-60 (1993)
(describing the necessity for federal court intervention in civil rights cases because of
the failure of elected state court judges to enforce constitutional guarantees).
34 Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 The judge has the power to override the jury's decision on whether to impose
the death penalty in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. Id at 1038. Judges do
not stand for election in Delaware. DEL. CONST. art. IV., § 3. In Harris, the Supreme
Court, over the sole dissent of Justice Stevens, upheld Alabama's practice of allowing
judges to override jury decisions on sentence. The Court had previously upheld judge
overrides of jury recommendations of sentence in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984). The jury's sentence is final in 29 states. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1038. In four
other death-penalty states, the jury plays no role in the sentencing decision. Id.
36 Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1040.
37 Lisa Stansky, Elected Judges Favor Death Penalty, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.
(Ga.), Nov. 24, 1989, at 11 (quoting Dean Gerald Uelman of Santa Clara University
Law School, who has studied the relation between methods of selection and judicial
behavior).
38 Gerald Uelmen, Elected Judiciary, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 170-71 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Supp. I 1992).
39 See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). For a description
of the failure of judges to discharge their constitutional responsibility to protect the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see id at 1855-57.
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orders that make no pretense of fairly resolving the issues before the
court.
This Article examines the influence of the politics of crime on judicial
behavior in capital cases. A fair and impartial judge is essential in any
proceeding, but perhaps nowhere more so than in capital cases, where
race,40 poverty,41 inadequate court-appointed counsel,42 and popular pas-
sions" can influence the extermination of a human life. The legal system
40 See U.S. GAO, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN
OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990) (analyzing 28 studies of capital sentencing and
finding a "remarkably consistent" pattern of racial disparities); see also DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (1990) (describing a
study of capital sentencing in Georgia that found that the "worst offenders" are not
always those executed, that many of the executed died for crimes that were not
"among the most aggravated and therefore the most blameworthy cases," and that
race is at least part of the explanation for this discrepancy); SAMUEL R. GROSS &
ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SEN-
TENCING 212 (1989) (concluding that "de facto racial discrimination in capital sentenc-
ing is legal in the United States").
41 Poor defendants are frequently assigned lawyers who are not provided funds for
expert or investigative assistance. See, e.g., Firsthand Accounts of Capital Justice,
NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990, at 40 (relating that 54.2% of capital trial lawyers surveyed
felt that courts provided inadequate funds for investigation and experts, and quoting
one Louisiana appointed counsel's complaint that "[i]t was a waste of time to ask the
court for funds. I knew the bastards."); Fredric N. Tuilsky, Poor Defendants Pay the
Cost as Courts Save on Murder Trials, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1992, at Al, A18
(reporting that in 20 capital cases in Philadelphia in 1991 and 1992 the court paid for
investigators in only eight, spending an average of $605 in each, and provided funds
for experts, both psychologists, in only two cases, costing $400 in one case, $500 in the
other); see also Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty: "Old
Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal Process, 14 PACE L. REV. 1, 13-16 (1994) (discussing the
limits on fees for attorneys, investigation, and experts in capital cases); Jeff Rosen-
zweig, The Crisis in Indigent Defense: An Arkansas Commentary, 44 ARK. L. REV.
409, 410 (1991) (describing the denial of resources for expert and investigative assist-
ance in capital cases in Arkansas). Class considerations may also come into play in
the admission of victim-impact evidence. As one judge has noted:
Not only does the admission of Victim Impact Statements create two classes of
defendants, those who kill worthy members of society and those who kill less
worthy citizens, it necessarily creates classes of victims: those whose lives were so
worthwhile that their killer should be put to death, and those whose lives are so
worthless that their killer should only receive a sentence that will put them back
into society in less than ten years.
Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 760 (Ga. 1994) (Benham, P.J., dissenting).
42 Bright, supra note 39, at 1841-66; see also American Bar Ass'n, Toward a More
Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1,
16 (1990) (finding that "the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at
trial" are among the "principal failings of the capital punishment review process
today").
43 The Mississippi Supreme Court, while expressing the hope that "the days of
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indulges the presumption that judges are impartial. The Supreme Court
has steadily reduced the availability of habeas corpus review of capital
convictions," placing its confidence in the notion that state judges, who
lynch mobs are past," has observed "that the emotions which compelled our forbears
to such violence endure." Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1214 (Miss. 1985). For
other examples of the emotions that often accompany a capital trial, see Coleman v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1489-1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (describing the pretrial publicity of
six murders and the reaction of the community, including the testimony of one juror
that community sentiment was "fry 'em, electrocute 'em"); cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164
(1986); Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1086-88 (11th Cir. 1985) (relating that the
father of a murder victim lunged toward the defendant during a trial in the presence
of the jury screaming and shouting "He'll pay! You're liable!"), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1088 (1986); Angry Fathers Confront Gang Who Killed Their Daughters, LEGAL
INTELLIGENcER, Oct. 13, 1994, at 4 (relating how victims' fathers .berated gang mem-
bers, convicted of murder and rape, during the capital sentencing phase of a trial,
saying among other things: "You are worse than spit. You belong in hell."); Ex-
Rosewell Woman's Killer Gets Life, ATLANTA CONST., May 9, 1995, at C6 (describing
the in-court attack by a victim's father after a defendant received a life sentence for
murder and rape; the father attempted to strangle the defendant before four deputies
pulled him off); Steve McVicker, The Last Word: Judge Bill "Roy Bean" Harmon
Grandstands at a Murder Trial-Again, HOUSTON PRESS, Feb. 17-23, 1994, at 4
(reporting that a victim's father was allowed to yell obscenities at the defendant in the
presence of jurors and the press); Don Plummer, Slain Cop's Father: 'All I Can Do Is
Cry', ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 8, 1994, at B1 (describing the testimony and tears of co-
workers and relatives of a murder victim during the presentation of victim-impact
testimony at the sentencing stage of a capital trial).
44 The Court has limited the availability of the writ to vindicate constitutional
rights by: adopting strict rules of procedural default, see, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 533-36 (1986), Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982), Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-91 (1977), and Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Proce-
dural Default of Federal Habeas Claims in Capital Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193
(1989); excluding most Fourth Amendment claims from habeas corpus review, Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); requiring deference to factfinding by state court judges,
see, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 499 U.S. 539 (1981), and Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025
(1984); making it more difficult for petitioners to obtain an evidentiary hearing to
prove a constitutional violation, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); adopting
an extremely restrictive doctrine regarding the retroactivity of constitutional law,
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly
Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1991); reducing the harmless error standard
for constitutional violations recognized in federal habeas review, Brecht v. Abraham-
son, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993); and restricting when a constitutional violation may be
raised in a second habeas petition, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). See gener-
ally Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1643, 1650 (1993) ("A
strong theme[ ], embraced by a consistent and substantial majority of the Justices...
[is] sharply reducing the involvement of the federal judiciary in the day-to-day busi-
ness of reviewing capital cases"); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41
UCLA L. REV. 303, 303-04 (1993). Pending antiterrorism legislation includes even
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take the same oath as federal judges to uphold the Constitution, can be
trusted to enforce it.45 This confidence, however, is frequently misplaced,
given the overwhelming pressure on elected state judges to heed, and
perhaps even to lead, the popular cries for the death of criminal
defendants.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the increasing use of the crime
issue in local and national politics and the extraordinary prominence of
the death penalty as a litmus test for politicians, including politicians who
serve as judges, purporting to be "tough" on crime. Part II examines the
politics of becoming and remaining a judge in such a climate. Part III
assesses the effect of this political climate on a judge's ability to preside
impartially over highly publicized capital cases. Part IV proposes some
modest steps that might limit the influence of politics and the passions of
the moment on judicial behavior.
I. CRIME IN POLITICS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
IN THE POLITICS OF CRIME
During the Cold War, many politicians, seeking to avoid more contro-
further restrictions of habeas corpus. The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act
of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. S7857 (daily ed. June 7, 1995),
requires deference by federal courts to decisions of state courts unless the decision is
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law," id. § 604(3), establishes a statute of limitation for the filing of habeas corpus
petitions, id. § 601, further restricts when a federal court may conduct an evidentiary
hearing, id. § 604(4), and adds new barriers to hearing a successive habeas corpus
petition, id. § 605. See David Cole, Destruction of the Habeas Safety Net, LEGAL
TIMES, June 19, 1995, at 30.
46 See, e.g., Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721 (rejecting the argument that a less demanding
harmless-error standard in federal habeas review will result in the state courts refus-
ing to find error harmless, unless litigants showed "affirmative evidence that state-
court judges are ignoring their oath"); Sumner, 449 U.S. at 549 (expressing the view
that deference to state court factfinding is appropriate because "[s]tate judges as well
as federal judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and there
is no reason to think that because of their frequent differences of opinions as to how
that document should be interpreted, all are not doing their mortal best to discharge
their oath of office"); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (requiring
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims and quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886): "State courts are 'equally
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.' "); Duckworth v. Ser-
rano, 454 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (relying upon and quoting Ex parte Royall to recall the duty
of both state and federal courts to enforce the Constitution). But see Stone, 428 U.S.
at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[s]tate judges popularly elected may
have difficulty resisting popular pressures not experienced by federal judges given
lifetime tenure," and calling for an assumption that there is "a general lack of appro-
priate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several
States").
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versial and difficult issues, professed their opposition to Communism.
Because almost everyone aspiring to public office was against Commu-
nism, politicians sought in various ways-such as support for loyalty
oaths and investigation of unamerican activities-to demonstrate just
how strongly they were opposed to Communism. Those who questioned
the wisdom of such measures were accused of not being sufficiently stri-
dent-"soft" on Communism.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and other Soviet-bloc govern-
ments, crime has emerged as an issue that appears equally one-sided. No
one is in favor of violent crime. Politicians demonstrate their toughness
by supporting the death penalty, longer prison sentences,4 and measures
to make prison life even harsher than it is already.47 Those who question
the wisdom, cost, and effectiveness of such measures are branded "soft on
crime." Whether sound public policy emerges from such a discussion of
crime is a question to be addressed elsewhere. 48 The emergence of crime
4 See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, New Prisons Cast Shadow over Higher Education,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995, at A21 (reporting on California's plans to spend, for the
first time, more on prisons than for its two university systems-because its prison
population grew from 23,511 to 126,140 in 15 years and the state anticipated an even
greater population due to the passage of a "three strikes and you're out" law); Wil-
liam Claiborne, 'Three Strikes' Tough on Courts Too, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at
Al (describing the impact on judiciaries and prisons of new California laws requiring
twice the normal sentence for a person convicted of a second felony, and 25 years to
life for a third felony); 25 Years for a Slice of Pizza, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at 21
(relating that a 27-year-old man received a 25-year sentence under California's "three
strikes and you're out" law for stealing a slice of pizza).
47 See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Chain Gangs to Return to Roads of Alabama, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1995, § 1, at 16 (reporting the Alabama prison commissioner's purchase of
300 sets of leg irons, at a cost of $17,000, to make Alabama the first state in the nation
to reinstitute chain gangs); Seth Mydans, Taking No Prisoners, In Manner of Speak-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at 6 (describing how a sheriff in Maricopa County,
Arizona substituted bologna sandwiches for hot lunches, discontinued all movies,
banned cigarettes and coffee, and housed some prisoners in tents); Adam Nossiter,
Making Hard Time Harder, States Cut Jail TV and Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994,
at 1 (describing efforts to take away television and exercise for prisoners in many
states, the Mississippi legislature's decision to clothe prisoners in striped uniforms
with the word "convict" emblazoned on the back, and some Mississippi legislators'
"talk of restoring fear to prisons, of caning, of making prisoners 'smell like a pris-
oner' "); David J. Rothman, The Crime of Punishment, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 17,
1994, at 34, 34-35, 37-38 (describing the severe overcrowding in U.S. prisons, pseudo-
military "boot camps" for young offenders, and other aspects of the culture of punish-
ment in this country, where the rate of incarceration-455 per 100,000-is one of the
highest in the world).
48 See DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE
OF DEATH Row (1995) (describing Florida's experience with its capital punishment
statute enacted in 1973, the state's inability to impose the death penalty consistently
and swiftly, and the burden the death penalty has placed on courts and other institu-
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as a dominant political issue is, however, not only having an impact on
the behavior of politicians seeking positions in the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government, but also on the behavior of judges who are
sworn to uphold the Constitution, a document that protects the rights of
those accused of even the most serious crimes.
Even before the end of the Cold War, Richard Nixon demonstrated the
potency of the crime issue by promising, in campaign speeches and in his
acceptance of the Republican nomination for President in 1968, to
replace Democrat Ramsey Clark as Attorney General.49 Clark's defense
of civil liberties and procedural safeguards had led some, including
Nixon, to denounce him as "soft on crime."5 In 1988, Lee Atwater urged
Republicans to concentrate on the crime issue because "[a]lmost every
candidate running out there as a Democrat is opposed to the death pen-
alty."51 George Bush was elected President that year with the help of
advertisements criticizing his opponent for allowing the furlough of Willie
Horton, who committed a rape in Maryland while on a weekend furlough
from a Massachusetts prison.52
As crime has become a more prominent issue in political campaigns,
the death penalty has become the ultimate vehicle for politicians to
demonstrate just how tough they are on crime. During California's 1990
gubernatorial primary, an aide to one Democratic candidate observed
wistfully that the carrying out of an execution would be a "coup" for her
tions); WENDY KAMINER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE: CRIME AND CULTURE (1995) (describ-
ing the gap between the crime debate in the United States and what is needed to deal
with the problem of violent crime). See generally Rothman, supra note 47 (collecting
authority to question the wisdom of crime policies in the United States).
For discussion of the wisdom of the "three strikes and you're out" laws that have
been passed in many states, see Joe D. Whitley, 3 Strikes: More Harm than Good,
FED. SENT. REP., Sept./Oct. 1994, at 63, and Stephen R. Sady, The Armed Career
Criminal Act-What's Wrong with "Three Strikes, You're Out?", FED. SENT. REP.,
Sept./Oct. 1994, at 69.
49 Martin F. Nolan, In Riots' Political Fallout, Right May Gain Might, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 3, 1992, at 24 ("[Nixon] attacked Johnson's liberal attorney gen-
eral, Ramsey Clark, by promising in every speech 'to appoint a new attorney
general'....").
50 See, e.g., David Zucchino, Political Preoccupation with Crime Isn't New, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 8, 1994, at 43A ("Nixon told campaign crowds that crime was
rising nine times faster than the population. When... Clark blurted out, accurately,
that 'there is no wave of crime in this country,' he became the laughingstock of the
campaign.").
51 John Harwood, Approving Atwater: GOP Committee Backs Its Chairman, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 17, 1989, at 1A.
52 Stephen Engelberg, Bush, His Disavowed Backers and a Very Potent Attack Ad,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1988, at Al. See generally Larry Martz et al., The Smear Cam-
paign, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 1988, at 16 (reporting on the general public dissatisfaction
with the tenor of the 1988 presidential campaign).
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opponent, the state attorney general."3 Candidates for governor of Texas
in 1990 argued about which of them was responsible for the most execu-
tions and who could do the best job in executing more people.54 One
candidate ran television advertisements in which he walked in front of
photographs of the men executed during his tenure as governor and
boasted that he had "made sure they received the ultimate penalty:
death."55 Another candidate ran advertisements taking credit for thirty-
two executions.56 In Florida, the incumbent gubernatorial candidate ran
television advertisements in 1990 showing the face of serial killer Ted
Bundy, who was executed during his tenure as governor. The governor
stated that he had signed over ninety death warrants in his four years in
office.57
The death penalty has been a dominant political issue in Florida for
over fifteen years. Bob Graham demonstrated in two terms as governor
and a successful race for the United States Senate that, as one observer
noted, "nothing [sells] on the campaign trail like promises to speed up the
death penalty."' 58 Graham's signing of death warrants enabled him to
reinvent himself as tough after being initially dubbed "Governor Jello. ' 59
He increased the number of warrants he signed when running for reelec-
tion as governor in 1982 even though he knew they would not be carried
out,6 0 and again stepped up the number of warrants he was signing each
53 Michael Kroll, Death-Penalty Appeal in State's Governor Race, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 30, 1989, at B13. The comment came after the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the death sentence of Robert Alton Harris. An
aide to Dianne Feinstein (the latter was running against Attorney General John Van
de Kamp in the Democratic primary) said, "What a coup for John [Van de Kamp] if
Harris were executed in May just before the primary .... I think Van de Kamp will
welcome the execution." Van de Kamp did not have the benefit of this hoped-for
"coup"; California did not execute Harris until April 22, 1992. Katherine Bishop,
After Night of Court Battles, a California Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at Al.
54 See Michael Oreskes, Death Penalty Politics: Candidates Rush to Embrace Exe-
cution, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 8, 1990, at Dl, D4.
55 Richard Cohen, Playing Politics with the Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
1990, at A19.
56 Id. (describing the Democratic primary campaign strategy of state Attorney
General Jim Mattox, and remarking that Mattox's opponent-then-Treasurer and
later Governor Ann Richards, herself a proponent of the death penalty-may have
found the "nonlethal nature of her office" a disadvantage in the competition).
57 Id. Bob Martinez proclaimed that Bundy and the other 89 had each "committed
a heinous crime that I don't want to choose to describe to you [sic]." Id.
58 VON DREHLE, supra note 48, at 325.
59 Id. at 268.
60 Id. at 200-01. Federal courts were granting automatic stays of execution pend-
ing the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals on an issue that affected every capital
case in Florida. Id. at 200. One federal district court observed that the signing of the
warrants "ranges between legally unsound and futile," but it had no effect on Gra-
ham. Id.
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month when running for the Senate in 1986.1 One assistant attorney
general responsible for representing the state in capital cases had to work
so hard as a result of Graham's warrant-issuing spree during his Senate
campaign that the prosecutor commented, "Nine months of Bob Graham
running for the Senate nearly killed me."6
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton demonstrated that he was tough on
crime in his 1992 campaign by scheduling the execution of a brain-dam-
aged man shortly before the New Hampshire primary." Clinton had
embraced the death penalty in 1982 after his defeat in a bid for reelection
as governor of Arkansas in 1980.1 In his presidential campaign ten years
later, Clinton returned from New Hampshire to preside over the execu-
tion of Rickey Ray Rector, an African-American who had been sen-
tenced to death by an all-white jury."5 Rector had destroyed part of his
brain when he turned his gun on himself after killing the police officer for
whose murder he received the death sentence. Logs at the prison show
that in the days leading up to his execution, Rector was howling and
barking like a dog, dancing, singing, laughing inappropriately, and saying
that he was going to vote for Clinton. 6 Clinton denied clemency and
allowed the execution to proceed, thereby protecting himself from being
labeled as "soft on crime" and helping the Democrats to take back the
crime issue. Clinton's first three television advertisements in his bid for
reelection-already begun a year and a half before the 1996 presidential
election-all focused on crime and Clinton's support to expand the death
penalty.67
61 Id. at 293.
62 Id.
63 Marshall Frady, Annals of Law and Politics: Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 22, 1993, at 105, 105.
64 George E. Jordan, Campaign 92: Clinton & Crime; Supports Capital Punishment
as Sign of Toughness, NEWSDAY, May 4, 1992, at 3 (recounting Clinton's relatively
liberal exercise of executive clemency during his first term and his later transforma-
tion into a death-penalty "hardliner"); Mark I. Pinsky, Will Clinton Again Oppose
Executions? Old Pal Says Maybe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at A5 (describing Clin-
ton's change from an opponent of the death penalty to a supporter).
65 Frady, supra note 63, at 105, 115.
66 Id. at 105.
67 Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Gets Early Start on Ad Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1995, at A12 (describing $2.4 million worth of television advertising by the
Clinton campaign to be run in two dozen markets nationwide in July 1995). In one
advertisement, a police officer says, "It's not about politics. It's about a ban on deadly
assault weapons. It's about a tough new death penalty law. President Clinton is help-
ing us make this a safer nation." Id. In another advertisement, Clinton says, "Deadly
assault weapons off our streets. 100,000 more police on the streets. Expand the death
penalty. That's how we'll protect America." Todd S. Purdum, The Ad Campaign,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at A12; see also Elizabeth Kolbert, Clinton, Playing the
Early Bird, Is Lining Up Campaign-Style Ads, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1995, at 1
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By 1994, crime had so eclipsed other issues that an official of the
National Governor's Association commented that the "top three issues in
gubernatorial campaigns this year are crime, crime, and crime."6 Stark
images of violence, flashing police lights, and shackled prisoners domi-
nated the campaign, and candidates went to considerable lengths to
emphasize their enthusiasm for the death penalty and attack their oppo-
nents for any perceived hesitancy to carry out executions swiftly.69 Even
after Texas carried out forty-five executions during Democrat Ann Rich-
ards's four years as governor, George W. Bush attacked Governor Rich-
ards during his successful 1994 campaign against her, complaining that
Texas should execute even more people, even more quickly. 0 Bush's
younger brother Jeb ran a television advertisement in his 1994 campaign
for governor of Florida in which the mother of a murder victim blamed
incumbent Governor Lawton Chiles for allowing the convicted killer to
remain on death row for thirteen years.7 ' Jeb Bush knew, and acknowl-
edged when asked, that there was nothing Chiles could have done to
speed up the execution because the case was pending in federal court.7 2
Jeb Bush also argued that Florida's eight executions since Chiles's elec-
tion in 1990 were not enough. 3
In her quest to win the 1994 California gubernatorial race, Kathleen
Brown found that her personal opposition to the death penalty was
(describing as unprecedented Clinton's broadcasting of the advertisements a year and
haif before the election).
68 Leslie Phillips, Crime Pays as a Political Issue, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 1994, at
11A; see also Mark Horvit & Ken Herman, Politicians on Anti-Crime Bandwagon,
HOUSTON POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at A-27 (reporting that candidates in the primary elec-
tions for state and national office in Texas were "waging a sound-bite war over who is
the toughest crime-fighter among them"); Howard Kurtz, In Political Ads Across the
U.S., Crime Is the Weapon of Choice, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at Al, A4 (reporting
that "[s]ix years after George Bush's presidential campaign turned furloughed mur-
derer Willie Horton into a national symbol of Democratic softheadedness, the spirit
of Hortonism is thriving" in television commercial wars with "crime... the 30-second
weapon of choice").
69 See, e.g., Bob Minzesheimer, Executioner's Song Heard in Governor Races, USA
TODAY, Oct. 27, 1994, at 9A (reporting that "[flrom California to Texas to Florida,
candidates for governor sound as if they're running to be executioner"); Phillips,
supra note 68, at 9A (describing various campaign appeals based on crime and quot-
ing one Democratic media consultant as saying, "No matter how far to the right we
get, Republicans get righter. We say 'Hang 'em.' They say, 'Gas 'em.' ").
70 Bush Brothers Cast Foes as "Soft" for Not Killing Enough, ARM. REPUBLIC,
Nov. 3, 1994, at B5 ("That's one a month and sets a standard for the 50 states. But it's
not good enough for George W., who apparently thinks the governor ought to admin-
ister the coup de grace herself.").
71 Id.
72 Id ("[T]he ad is dishonest and exploitative, but Bush insists it's a good way to
elevate the public discussion of crime. . .
73 Id
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widely viewed as a major liability74 even though she promised to carry
out executions as governor. She had to defend herself against Governor
Pete Wilson's charges that, because of her personal moral convictions,
she would appoint judges like Rose Bird. Governor Wilson, whose
approval ratings had been "abysmal," recovered by following the advice
of the old master, Richard Nixon, who told him to hit his opponent hard
on crime.7" Candidate Brown responded to the charges by producing an
advertisement proclaiming her willingness to enforce the death penalty.76
Nevertheless, she lost to Wilson. Both Illinois Governor Jim Edgar and
Iowa Governor Terry E. Branstad similarly attacked their opponents'
personal opposition to the death penalty.77 Both were reelected. New
York Governor Mario Cuomo faced heated attacks for his vetoes of
death-penalty legislation during twelve years in office and his refusal to
return a New York prisoner to Oklahoma for execution.78 Cuomo
defended himself by proposing a referendum on the death penalty, 79 but
still lost his office to a candidate who promised to reinstate capital pun-
ishment and to send the prisoner back to Oklahoma for execution.8"
As the public debate on crime and its solutions has become increas-
74 See, e.g. Dan Walters, Odd Segments of "60 Minutes", SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan.
26, 1994, at A3.
75 Howard Fimeman, Riding the Wave, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 1995, at 19, 19
(describing how Wilson employed this strategy to win, linking his foe to every "them"
feared by California voters, including "lenient judges" and "criminal-defense
lawyers").
76 Susan Yoachum, Ad Wars Raise Politics of Blame, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1994,
at A6.
77 Vote '94: The Nation, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, at A6. In Iowa, which does not
have capital punishment, Governor Branstad, in response to polls showing his chal-
lenger, Bonnie Campbell, was in the lead, "turned to the crime issue, and specifically
Campbell's opposition to capital punishment." Id. He followed the example of Gov-
ernor Edgar, who had "built a huge lead over Democratic challenger Dawn Clark
Netsch thanks in part to a barrage of television commercials stressing her opposition
to the death penalty." Id.; see also Minzesheimer, supra note 69, at 9A (reporting
that the issue of their opponents' personal opposition to the death penalty had
"clearly helped" both Edgar and Wilson in their bids for reelection).
78 See Ian Fisher, Clamor over Death Penalty Dominates Debate on Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at 45, 48 (reporting that although Cuomo built more prisons than
all New York governors before him combined, "[a] central paradox of Mr. Cuomo's
12-year tenure is that no matter what he has done on crime, he is judged most often
by his opposition to the death penalty, even though crime rates are down, jail time is
up and police forces have grown"); see also Cuomo Takes Anti-Crime Stance, WASH.
POST, Jan. 6, 1994, at A9.
79 James Dao, Cuomo Proposes a Referendum on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1994, at B5.
80 Pataki on the Record: Excerpts from a Talk on Campaign Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1994, at B4. Upon assuming office, Governor George Pataki carried out his
promise and sent Grasso back to Oklahoma, and that state executed Grasso on March
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ingly one-sided and vacuous, the death penalty has become the ultimate
litmus test for demonstrating that one is not "soft on crime." The impact
of this development has been felt not only in the executive and legislative
branches of government, where popular sentiment is expected to play a
major role in the development of policy, but also in the judiciary, where
judges are expected to follow the law, not the election returns.
II. THE POLITICS OF BECOMING AND STAYING A JUDGE
Judges in most states that have capital punishment are subject to elec-
tion or retention. Although all judges take oaths to uphold the Constitu-
tion, 1 including its provisions guaranteeing certain protections for
persons accused of crimes, judges who must stand for election or reten-
tion depend on the continued approval of the voters for their jobs and
concomitant salaries and retirement benefits. A common route to the
bench is through a prosecutor's office, where trying high-profile capital
cases can result in publicity and name recognition for a prosecutor with
judicial ambitions. A judge who has used capital cases to advance to the
bench finds that presiding over capital cases results in continued public
attention. Regardless of how one becomes a judge, rulings in capital
cases may significantly affect whether a judge remains in office or moves
to a higher court.
A. Judges Face Election in Most States That Employ the Death Penalty
Almost all judicial selection systems fall into one of four categories.8 2
First, judges in eleven states and the District of Columbia are never sub-
jected to election at any time in their judicial careers.' Second, the
20, 1995. John Kifner, Inmate Is Executed in Oklahoma, Ending N.Y Death Penalty
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at Al.
81 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[A]U executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution .... ").
82 Because some states employ different methods of judicial selection for different
courts, the number of states in the four categories described exceeds 50.
83 See CONN. CONST. art 5, § 2 (governor nominates judges from a list that a judi-
cial selection commission submits, for eight-year terms); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3
(governor appoints judges and justices, with advice and consent of the senate, for 12-
year terms); HAw. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (governor appoints judges, from a judicial selec-
tion commission's list of nominees and with consent of the senate, for 10-year terms;
judicial selection commission determines retention); ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 8 (gov-
ernor nominates judicial officers, with confirmation by a committee from both houses
of the legislature), art. 6, § 4 (judges hold office for seven-year terms); MAss. CONST.
ch. 2, § 1, art. 9 (governor appoints all judicial officers, with advice and consent of the
governor's council), pt. 2, ch. 3, art. I (judicial officers hold office during good behav-
ior); MD. CONST. art. 41D (governor appoints district court judges, with advice and
consent of the senate, for 10-year terms); N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 46 (governor and
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judges of three states are elected by vote of the state legislature."' Third,
the judges of twenty-nine states are subjected to contested elections,
either partisan or nonpartisan, at some point in their careers, 85 whether
council appoint judicial officers), art. 73 (judges hold office during good behavior);
N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, paras. 1, 3 (governor appoints judges and justices, with confir-
mation by the senate, for initial seven-year terms; upon reappointment judges and
justices serve during good behavior); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (governor appoints court
of appeals judges, with advice and consent of the senate, for 14-year terms); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 8-2-1, 8-8-7 (1985) (governor appoints superior court and district court jus-
tices, with confirmation by the senate; justices hold office during good behavior); VT.
CONST. ch. II, §§ 32, 34 (governor appoints judges from a judicial nominating body's
list of candidates, with advice and consent of the senate, for six-year terms; general
assembly votes for retention; general assembly can vote by simple majority to
remove); D.C. CODE Arm. § 11-1501 (1995) (President selects judges from names that
a commission recommends, with advice and consent of the Senate, for 15-year terms;
judicial qualification commission reviews performance).
84 R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 4 (vote of two houses of the legislature to select or remove
supreme court judges; judges hold office until death, resignation, or removal by a vote
of both houses); S.C. CoNST. art. V, § 3 (general assembly elects supreme court jus-
tices for 10-year terms), § 8 (general assembly elects court of appeals judges for six-
year terms), § 13 (general assembly elects circuit judges for six-year terms); VA.
CONST. art. VI, § 7 (vote of both houses of the general assembly elects all judges and
justices; supreme court justices serve 12-year terms, all other judges serve eight-year
terms).
85 See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.13 (all judges elected); ALA. CODE §§ 12-2-1,
12-3-3, 12-3-4 (1986) (supreme court justices, court of criminal appeals judges, and
court of civil appeals judges all elected for six-year terms); ARK. CONST. art. 7, §§ 6,
17, 29 (supreme court justices elected for eight-year terms; circuit court judges elected
for four-year terms; county court judges elected for two-year terms); FLA. CONST. art.
V, § 11 (circuit judges and county court judges elected in competitive elections; gover-
nor fills all vacancies from a judicial nominating commission's list); GA. CoNST. art. 6,
§ 7, para. 1 (superior and state court judges elected in nonpartisan elections for four-
year terms; supreme court justices and court of appeals judges elected in nonpartisan
elections for six-year terms); IDAHO CONsT. art. VI, § 7 (supreme court justices and
district judges selected in nonpartisan elections); ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12 (judges ini-
tially selected in partisan elections; thereafter judges subject to nonpartisan retention
elections); KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 6 (district court judges selected in elections); Ky.
CONST. § 117 (all judicial officers elected in nonpartisan elections); LA. CONST. art. 5,
§ 22 (judges and justices elected in regular elections); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (all trial
judges except for district judges elected for 15-year terms), § 5 (governor appoints
circuit court judges to fill unexpired terms or for one year, whichever is less; thereaf-
ter judges subject to election); MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8, 9, 12 (supreme court
justices elected at nonpartisan elections for eight-year terms; court of appeals judges
elected by district in nonpartisan elections for six-year terms; circuit judges elected at
nonpartisan elections for six-year terms); MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 7 (all judges elected
for six-year terms); Miss. CONST. art. 6, §§ 145, 145A, 145B, 149, 153 (supreme court
justices elected by district for eight-year terms; circuit and chancery court judges
elected for four-year terms); MoNT. CONST. art. 3, ch. 2, §§ 202, ch.2, §§ 201, 203
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during initial selection for the bench or after appointment by the gover-
nor. 6 The fourth category of judicial selection systems includes those
systems in which the judge or justice is at some time subjected to a reten-
tion election but never faces an opponent. Thirteen states employ such a
system. 8
7
(supreme court justices elected at general elections for eight-year terms; district court
judges elected by district for six-year terms); NEV. CONST. art. 6, §§ 3, 5 (supreme
court justices elected in general elections for six-year terms; district court judges
elected by district for six-year terms); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33 (justices and judges
initially selected in partisan elections; thereafter subject to nonpartisan retention elec-
tions; supreme court justices and court of appeals judges serve eight-year terms, dis-
trict judges serve six-year terms, and metropolitan court judges serve four-year
terms); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 6, 10 (supreme court justices elected for 14-year terms;
county court judges elected for 10-year terms); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (judges and
justices elected for eight-year terms); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6, 9 (supreme court jus-
tices elected for 10-year terms; district court judges elected for six-year terms); OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 6 (judges and justices elected for six-year terms); OKLA. CONST. art.
7, §§ 2-3 (justices and judges elected in nonpartisan elections; supreme court justices
serve six-year terms); OR. CONST. art VII, § 1 (judges and justices elected for six-year
terms); PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 13 (governor appoints judges and justices with advice and
consent of the senate if senate is in session; after an initial 10-month term of office,
judges and justices subject to election); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 (judges elected in
nonpolitical elections for eight-year terms; governor appoints supreme court justices
for a three-year term, then justices subject to nonpolitical ballot; thereafter justices
serve eight-year terms with retention elections); TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3-4
(supreme court justices elected in statewide races for eight-year terms; lower court
judges elected by district for eight-year terms); TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 4, 6-7
(supreme court justices elected for six-year terms; court of criminal appeals judges
elected for six-year terms; court of appeals justices elected for six-year terms; district
judges elected for four-year terms); WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5 (supreme court
judges elected statewide for six-year terms; superior court judges elected by county
for four-year terms); W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2, 5 (supreme court of appeals jus-
tices elected statewide for 12-year terms; circuit court judges elected by circuit for
eight-year terms); Wis. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4-5, 7 (supreme court justices elected for
10-year terms; court of appeals judges elected for six-year terms; circuit court judges
elected for six-year terms).
86 For the purposes of this Article, "contested election" means an election in which
the candidate runs against another candidate or candidates.
87 See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5-6 (governor appoints supreme court justices
and superior court judges, upon nomination by a judicial council; judges subject to
nonpartisan retention elections); ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, §§ 37-38 (governor appoints
judges and justices; judges subject to nonpartisan retention elections); CAL. CONST.
art. 6, § 16 (governor appoints judges or appoints candidates for judgeships to run in
unopposed elections; judges subject to retention elections; supreme court justices
serve for 12-year terms; superior court judges serve for six-year terms); COLO. CONST.
art. 6, §§ 20, 25 (governor appoints judges and justices from a judicial nominating
commission's list; thereafter judges and justices subject to retention elections); FLA.
CONST. art. 5, § 10 (appeals court judges and supreme court justices subject to reten-
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There are currently thirty-eight states that have capital punishment
statutes.' Thirty-two states both elect their judges and sentence people
to death. 9
In nine states-including Alabama and Texas-judges run under party
affiliations.' ° The success of the party in national or state elections may
have a significant impact on the judiciary. For example, Texas Republi-
tion elections after six-year terms; governor fills all vacancies from a judicial nominat-
ing commission's list); IND. CONST. art. 7, §§ 10-11 (governor appoints judges and
justices; thereafter judges and justices subject to retention elections); IOWA CONST.
art. 5, §§ 16-17 (governor appoints judges and justices from a judicial nominating
commission's list; thereafter judges and justices subject to retention elections); KAN.
CONST. art 3., § 5 (governor appoints supreme court justices from a nominating com-
mission's list; thereafter justices subject to retention elections); MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 5A (governor appoints appellate court judges with advice and consent of the senate;
judges subject to approval or rejection vote at polls after one year in office; thereafter
judges serve 10-year terms); Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29(a), (c)(1) (governor initially
appoints judges for a one-year term from a nonpartisan judicial commission's list; at
end of that term and longer terms thereafter, judges subject to retention election);
NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21 (governor appoints judges and justices from a judicial nomi-
nating commission's list; after three years in office, and at the expiration of six-year
terms thereafter, judges and justices subject to retention elections); UTAH CONST. art.
VIII, §§ 8-9 (governor appoints all judges and justices, subject to approval of senate,
from a judicial nominating commission's list; at first general election after three years
of service all judges subject to retention elections; thereafter supreme court justices
have 10-year terms, other judges have six-year terms, all with retention elections);
WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (governor appoints all justices and district court judges from a
judicial nominating commission's list; at first general election after one year of service
all judges subject to retention elections; thereafter supreme court justices have eight-
years terms, district court judges have six-year terms, all subject to retention
elections).
88 Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 2, at 1; see also James Dao, Death Penalty in
New York Reinstated After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1995, at Al (noting that New York Governor George E. Pataki's signing of a death
penalty bill into law made New York the 38th state to have capital punishment).
The states with capital punishment statutes are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
89 All of the states with death penalties except Connecticut, Delaware, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia employ elections at some stage
in judicial selection or retention.
90 Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. John Cornyn, Ruminations on the
Nature of Texas Judging, 25 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 367, 380 n.40 (1993) (citing Orrin W.
Johnson & Laura J. Urbis, Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 525, 526, n.6 (1992)).
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cans swept into state judicial offices as part of the party's general success
in the 1994 elections. Republicans won every elected position they
sought on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Texas Supreme
Court.9 ' Republican straight-ticket voting contributed to the defeat of
nineteen Democratic judges and a Republican sweep of all but one of the
forty-two contested races for countywide judgeships in Harris County,
Texas, which includes Houston.92 The dean of one Texas law school
observed that "[i]f Bozo the Clown had been running as a Republican
against any Democrat, he would have had a chance."9" Such straight-
ticket voting, which comprised one-quarter of all votes cast in Harris
County, also resulted in the removal of the only three black judges and
left only one Hispanic on the bench.9
The lack of racial diversity now found in Houston is consistent with the
exclusion of minorities from the bench throughout the country.95 One
reason for the lack of minority judges is that in many states-particularly
those in the "death belt" states such as Florida and Texas-judges have
long been elected from judicial districts in which the voting strength of
racial minorities is diluted.'
91 Williams, supra note 12, at A29 (describing the Republican sweep in the Texas
elections for the state's highest civil and criminal courts).
92 Alan Bernstein, Judge Elections Debated Anew; Straight-Ticket Voting Helped
Topple 19 Democrat Jurists, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at Al (arguing that the
explosion of Republican straight-ticket voting for Harris County judges indicates a
need to elect judges in a nonpartisan manner). The one Republican judicial candidate
who lost had been denounced by some conservative activists for accepting the
endorsement of the Houston Gay and Lesbian Caucus. Id.
93 Williams, supra note 12, at A29.
94 Bernstein, supra note 92, at Al. One of the winning judicial candidates
observed, "There were Republicans who spent a fortune and those of us who didn't
spend a dime, and we are all in office today.., because of the landslide." Id.
95 Mark Curriden, Racism Mars Justice in U.S., Panel Reports, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 11, 1991, at D1, D3 (observing that only six of Georgia's 134 superior
court judges were African-American, and those six were in three judicial circuits);
Second Black Alabama Supreme Court Justice Sworn In, COLUMBUS LEDGER-
ENQUIRER (Ga.), Nov. 2, 1993, at B-2 (noting that there was only one African-Ameri-
can among Alabama's 17 appellate court judges, and only 12 blacks among the state's
255 circuit and district court judges); see also Rorie Sherman, Is Mississippi Turning?,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1 (reporting that only 2.6% of all state court judges in the
United States were black).
96 See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1499-1509 (11th Cir. 1994) (describing dilu-
tion of the black vote in Duval County, Florida), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 912 (5th Cir. 1993)
(King, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the district court's findings that countywide elec-
tions of judges in Texas have resulted in dilution of the voting power of African-
Americans and Hispanics), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
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B. Prosecuting Capital Cases as a Stepping Stone to the Bench
One of the most frequently traveled routes to the state trial bench is
through prosecutors' offices. A capital case provides a prosecutor with a
particularly rich opportunity for media exposure and name recognition
that can later be helpful in a judicial campaign. Calling a press confer-
ence to announce that the police have captured a suspect and the prose-
cutor will seek the death penalty provides an opportunity for a prosecutor
to obtain news coverage and ride popular sentiments that almost any pol-
itician would welcome. The prosecutor can then sustain prominent media
coverage by announcing various developments in the case as they occur.
A capital trial provides one of the greatest opportunities for sustained
coverage on the nightly newscasts and in the newspapers. A noncapital
trial or resolution with a guilty plea does not produce such coverage.97
The relationship between prosecuting capital cases and moving to the
bench is evident in Georgia's Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, which sends
more people to death row than any other judicial circuit in the state. Two
of the four superior court judges in the circuit obtained their seats on the
bench after trying high-profile capital cases. Mullins Whisnant, who now
serves as chief superior court judge in the circuit, became a judge in 1978
after serving as the elected district attorney.98 He personally tried many
of the ten capital cases the office prosecuted in 1976 and 1977, five of
which involved African-Americans tried before all-white juries for homi-
cides of white victims.99 His last capital trial as prosecutor involved a
highly publicized rape, robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a white Meth-
odist Church organist by an African-American. 1°° The extensive news
coverage of the case included electronic and photographic coverage of
97 See, e.g., Don Plummer, Decision on Rower Costly for Taxpayers, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Feb. 16, 1995, at El (noting that the political benefits of a capital trial are
certainly not lost on Cobb County (Ga.) District Attorney Tom Charron, who, despite
public pressure from the presiding judge, rejected a defendant's offer to plead guilty
and waive his right to parole even though a trial would likely force the victim's young
children to testify and would cost the county up to $1,000,000); see also Chris Burritt,
Smith's Lawyers Pushing Hard for Plea Bargain Despite Refusal, ATLANTA CONST.,
June 24, 1995, at C5 (describing the refusal of South Carolina prosecutor Tommy Pope
to spare the death penalty for defendant Susan Smith, charged with the murder of her
two children, in exchange for a guilty plea and defense assertion that the refusal was
based on the prosecutor's "once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for celebrity and national
exposure").
98 Transcript of Hearing of Sept. 11-14, 1991, at 123, 124, 165, Brooks v. State, 415
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1992) (No. $92A0062) (on file with the Boston University Law
Review).
99 Defense Exhibits 1A, 2A (admitted at Hearing of Sept. 11-14, 1991), Brooks
(No. $92A0062) (on file with the Boston Univeristy Law Review).
100 Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), decision adhered to on remand, 809 F.2d 700 (11th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
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the trial. Whisnant made a highly emotional plea to jurors to join a "war
on crime" and "send a message" by sentencing the defendant to death.101
Once Whisnant became a judge, his chief assistant, William Smith, took
over as the district attorney. Smith personally tried many of the fourteen
capital cases that took place during his tenure before he joined his former
boss on the bench in 1988.102 One of those cases involved the highly
publicized trial of an African-American accused of being the "Silk Stock-
ing Strangler" responsible for the murders of several elderly white
women in the community.1
03
And benefits other than publicity came to Smith's eventual campaign
for judge as a result of his use of the death penalty as a district attorney.
In a case involving the murder of the daughter of a local contractor,
Smith contacted the victim's father and asked him if he wanted the death
penalty. 10 4 When he replied in the affirmative, Smith said that was all he
needed to know, 05 and subsequently obtained the death penalty at
trial.'" The victim's father rewarded Smith with a contribution of $5000
during Smith's successful run for judge in the next election. 10 7 The contri-
bution was the largest Smith received.108 Smith's chief assistant suc-
ceeded him as district attorney and, after prosecuting eight capital cases,
has announced an interest in the next opening on the Superior Court
bench.0 9 So close is the relationship between the judiciary and the pros-
ecutor's office in the circuit that the prosecutor's office has made the
assignments of criminal cases to judges for the last six years, assigning the
101 Id. at 1394-98, 1408-16 (holding that the prosecutor's improper expressions of
personal belief in capital punishment, discussion of his policy of rarely seeking the
death penalty, and his general "war on crime" speech did not render the defendant's
sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair). The prosecutor's closing argument is set
out in full in the appendix to the opinion of Circuit Judge Clark. Id. at 1443-48 (opin-
ion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102 Transcript of Hearing of Sept. 11-14, 1991, at 137-48, Brooks (No. S92A0062).
103 Id. at 139-40.
104 Transcript of Hearing of Oct. 21, 1988, at 38, Davis v. Kemp, No. 86-V-865 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Butts County 1988) (on fie with the Boston University Law Review) (testi-
mony of James Isham, father of the victim).
108 Id.
106 Davis v. State, 340 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. 1986) (affirming defendant's death sentence
on appeal by holding that sufficient evidence existed to support the armed robbery
and murder convictions), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986). The conviction and death
sentence were later set aside in a federal habeas corpus proceeding due to
prosecutorial misconduct. Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994).
107 Clint Claybrook, Slain Girl's Father Top Campaign Contributor, COLUMBUS
LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Ga.), Aug. 7, 1988, at B-1.
108 Id.
109 Jim Houston, Ruling on Judgeship Opens the Door for New Faces, COLUMBUS
LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Ga.), Feb. 7,1995, at A-i, A-8 (quoting prosecutor Doug Pullen
as saying that he is "definitely interested" in a judgeship).
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more serious drug and homicide cases to former prosecutors Whisnant
and Smith.1 '
These prosecutors in the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit have demon-
strated that capital cases produce good publicity even when a guilty ver-
dict is reversed for prosecutorial misconduct. After the United States
Court of Appeals set aside a death sentence because of a lynch-mob-type
appeal for the death penalty by then-District Attorney Smith, which the
court characterized as a "dramatic appeal to gut emotion" that "has no
place in a courtroom,""' Smith called a press conference, insisted he had
done nothing wrong, and announced that he would seek the death pen-
alty again in the case." 2 When a federal court set aside a second death
sentence due to similar misconduct,"' Smith called another press confer-
ence and expressed his "anger" at the decision, accused the reviewing
court of "sensationalism" and "emotionalism," suggested that the "judges
of this court have personal feelings against the death penalty," and vowed
to seek the death penalty again." 4
Attempts to exploit capital cases for political purposes may backfire,
however, particularly if the prosecution is not ultimately successful in
obtaining the death penalty. For example, a verdict of voluntary man-
slaughter instead of first degree murder transformed the case of Bruce R.
Morris in St. Charles County, Missouri, from one in which a defendant's
life was at stake to one in which a political career was at stake.
"[C]ourthouse observers, including [the prosecutor's] former employees"
criticized the prosecutor, who was a candidate for circuit court judge, and
110 Trisha Renaud, DA 's Office Assigned Cases to Judges, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP. (Ga.), Apr. 26, 1995, at 1, 2 (reporting the discovery of the assignment system by
defense lawyers who noticed a pattern of assignments; prosecutor Doug Pullen, while
acknowledging his office's involvement, dismissed it as "a wad of chewing gum on the
legal shoe of life").
"' Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 952-53 (11th Cir.) (finding that the prosecutor's
inflammatory remarks in the sentencing phase of the murder prosecution, which
appealed to the jury's fears and emotions and were highly prejudicial to the defend-
ant, rendered the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983).
112 Transcript of Hearing of Sept. 11-14, 1991, at 144-46, Brooks v. State, 415
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1992) (No. S92A0062) (on fie with the Boston University Law
Review); Defendant's Exhibit 40 (press release introduced at Hearing of Sept. 11-14,
1991), Brooks (No. $92A0062) (on file with the Boston University Law Review).
"13 In 1983, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
set aside the death sentence due to the prosecutor's argument during the sentencing
phase. Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1983). A petition for rehearing en
banc was granted, Brooks v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1984), although the en
banc court ultimately set aside the conviction and sentence on other grounds, Brooks
v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 700 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
114 Phil Gast, District Attorney Criticizes Court for Rejecting Sentence, COLUMBUS
ENQUIRER (Ga.), Sept. 17, 1983, at A-1, A-2.
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stated that the trial was the prosecutor's first jury trial in memory.115
They also accused him of taking the case to trial just because he was run-
ning for judge." 6
Prosecutors may be criticized for failure to seek the death penalty,
even when the law does not permit it. For example, a California prosecu-
tor criticized a Colorado prosecutor for not seeking the death penalty
against a defendant who had committed crimes in both states even
though the Colorado prosecutor explained that there were no statutory
aggravating circumstances that would permit him to seek the death
penalty."17
Although it may be unethical and improper for prosecutors to cam-
paign on promises to seek the death penalty or on their success in
obtaining it,"' there is no effective remedy to prevent the practice. 1 9
Moreover, capital cases produce so much publicity and name recognition
that explicit promises to seek death are hardly necessary. As a result,
prosecuting capital cases remains a way of obtaining a judgeship. As will
be discussed later, some persons who reach the bench in this manner have
difficulty relinquishing the prosecutorial role. But even when a prosecu-
tor is not seeking a judicial post, or is unsuccessful in obtaining one, the
political use of the death penalty in the discharge of prosecutorial respon-
sibilities may spill over into elections for judicial office and influence the
exercise of judicial discretion. The political consequences of decisions by
both prosecutor and judge become apparent for all to see.
C. The Death Penalty's Prominence in the Election, Retention, and
Promotion of Judges
With campaigning for the death penalty and against judges who over-
turn capital cases an effective tactic in the quest for other offices, it is not
surprising that the death penalty has become increasingly prominent in
115 Marianna Riley, Morris Verdict of Manslaughter Draws Criticism, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1988, at 1.
116 Id. He lost the election. Marianna Riley, Democratic Judges Rush, Dalton
Buck GOP Trend to Retain Seats, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 1988, at 1.
117 Ann Carnahan, DA Under Fire on Death Penalty; Critics Say Ritter Should
Have Made Capital Case in 3 Slayings, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 11A
(describing how Denver District Attorney Bill Ritter was under fire for not having
sought the death penalty against a triple-homicide suspect).
118 Kenneth Bresley, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Pen-
alty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 941, 946-52 (1994) (arguing that seeking the death penalty for
political reasons and campaigning on obtaining the death penalty violates a prosecu-
tor's responsibility to see that justice is done, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935), as well as the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1986), AMER-
ICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTOR'S STAN-
DARDS (3d ed. 1993), and the NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991)).
119 Id. at 952-58.
JUDGES & THE POLITICS OF DEATH
contested and retention elections for judges. Not only the judge, but her
political supporters as well, may suffer the consequences of an unpopular
ruling in a capital case.
Judicial campaigns in which the death penalty is an issue can degener-
ate to almost Orwellian levels of absurdity, raising serious questions
about the ability of judges to remain fair and impartial. An opponent can
seize upon a judge's ruling in one case and, by focusing on the facts of the
crime and completely ignoring the legal issue, make even the toughest
judge appear "soft on crime." As one commentator has noted:
When the mother of a young daughter, who was brutally murdered
and mutilated, complains in a television commercial about a judge
vacating the killer's death sentence, the judge has little recourse. A
judge can explain that a defendant's right was violated, which war-
rants a new trial, but the public, unfamiliar with constitutional law,
sees only the grieving mother and a picture of the innocent victim. 2 °
Opponents criticize judges for a lack of cruelty.12  Judges seek public
approval by announcing their delight in helping to extinguish human
life.122 Constitutional rights are dismissed as mere "technicalities." A
few rulings in highly publicized cases may become more important to a
judge's survival on the bench than qualifications, judicial temperament,
management of the docket, or commitment to the Constitution and the
rule of law.
123
In the 1994 primary election for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
the incumbent presiding judge accused another member of the court of
voting to grant relief for convicted defendants more often than other
judges.' 24 Although a Republican candidate for the second seat on the
120 Thomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect of Judicial Elections on
Judges' Ability to Protect Criminal Defendants' Rights, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 111, 127
(1988).
121 See Gerald F. Uelman, Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Over-
ture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2069, 2072 (1988) ("The questions [debated in state judicial
elections] are . . . simple: Should a judge who votes to reverse the conviction of a
heinous killer be kept on the bench?" (citing John Dixon Doesn't Think 20 Stab
Wounds Are Enough, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988 (full page advertisement))).
122 See Jerry Hicks, O.C. Judge Decries Delay in Executing the 'Deserving', L.A.
TIMEs, June 9, 1991, at Al (relating one judge's dismay that the six death sentences he
imposed would not be carried out soon because of appellate review).
123 Ross, supra note 120, at 111-12 (noting that elections can hamper a judge's
ability to be an impartial, unbiased adjudicator in that there is a negative public reac-
tion to what some see as the expansion of defendants' constitutional rights); see also
Kurt E. Scheuerman, Note, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV. 459, 481
(1993) (noting that an Oregon Supreme Court justice's defeat demonstrated how judi-
cial elections can turn, not on qualifications, or even jurisprudence, but on political
issues and results of individual cases).
124 Gardner Selby, 3 Positions Open on State's Top Criminal Appeals Court,
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court lamented what he called the "lynch mentality" of the campaign, 12
two other candidates for the Republican nomination, both former prose-
cutors, indicated their willingness to treat defendants severely.' 26 One
stated that the role of the court is to ensure justice, not to reverse convic-
tions because of "technicalities" or "honest mistakes,' 27 while the other
called the Court of Criminal Appeals a "citadel of technicality" that
neglected the interests of crime victims and citizens at large.128 Two can-
didates for the third position on the court criticized the incumbent for
granting a new trial to a man convicted of homicide. 29 One challenger
promised to bring a "common sense" approach to such cases.'3 0
An Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals judge, who was also a candi-
date for the state's supreme court, accused the Alabama Supreme Court
of being "too left and too liberal" in capital cases and challenged the
court to set execution dates in twenty-seven cases that were pending in
the federal courts on habeas corpus review.3 ' Similarly, Sacramento
Municipal Court Judge Gary Mullen, a candidate for superior court in
California in 1992, ran a television commercial that criticized the judicial
system for taking too long to execute Robert Alton Harris, the first per-
son executed under California's current death penalty law.'" 2 A former
governor of Colorado announced a campaign to remove one of his own
appointees from the state supreme court because of the appointee's votes
in capital cases.' 3 He also indicated he might oppose another of his
appointees, warning that "[h]e's got four years [before his retention elec-
HOUSTON POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at A-29 (describing the political jousting for three seats
on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in the 1994 elections).
125 Id. That candidate, Norman Lanford, who had previously been voted off the
trial court bench in Houston after unpopular rulings in criminal cases, see supra note
19-23 and accompanying text, was defeated in the Republican primary. See Results of
Statewide Race, HoUSTON POST, Apr. 13, 1994, at A-20.
126 Selby, supra note 124, at A-29.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. The court "ordered a new trial because the names of potential jurors had
been shuffled one too many times at the original trial." Id.
130 Id.
181 Tom Hughes, Montiel Challenges Court to Schedule Executions, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER (Ala.), May 19, 1994, at 3B.
132 Dan Bernstein, Race for Superior Court Seat Getting Political, SACRAMENTO
BEE, May 31, 1992, at B1 (describing the "political" campaigning tactics two candi-
dates used for the 1992 judicial elections to California's superior court). Despite
these tactics, the candidate lost the election. See Capitol Digest, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 21, 1992, at A4 (noting that Lloyd Connelly would take office as a Sacramento
County superior court judge in January 1993).
133 Burt Hubbard & Ann Carnahan, Angered Over Death Penalty, Lamm Assails
7wo Judges: Colorado High Court Justices' 'Disregard Vote of People,' Former Gover-
nor Charges, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 12, 1994, at 5A.
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tion]. Maybe he'll change his mind."'
Chief Justice James Exum survived an effort to remove him from the
North Carolina Supreme Court, but only with considerable financial cost
and loss to the standing of the court.'" 5 The person spearheading the
campaign against Exum stated that the defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird
in California had demonstrated that "you can mount a significant race
against a chief justice on the basis of the death penalty."' 6 Exum's critics
noted that he had voted against the death penalty while a member of the
North Carolina legislature and dissented from eighteen of the supreme
court's twenty-four rulings upholding a death sentence. 3 7
Challengers are not the only ones to use the death penalty. Incumbent
judges have used capital cases to advance their chances of reelection or
retention. A Florida Supreme Court justice recalled that when he was
responsible for assignments as a trial court judge, judges facing reelection
asked him for assignments to criminal cases because it would help get
their names in the press.'3 8 In Louisville, Kentucky, a judge sought to
have a colleague who was four days away from an election preside over
the arraignment of an African-American defendant accused of the highly
publicized murder of a white deputy sheriff.'3 9 Local television stations
set up numerous cameras in the courtroom.'" The judge on whose
docket the case appeared summoned defense counsel to chambers and
explained that Judge Jim Shake would preside at the arraignment
because "Jim's on the ballot Tuesday."''
In another example of judicial exploitation of capital cases, Bob Austin,
134 Id.
135 See Maura Dolan & Don Irwin, Anti-Bird Drive Inspires Moves in Other States,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1986, pt. 1, at 1, 18 (estimating that campaign costs would reach
between $500,000 and $1,000,000 for a job that pays $75,000 per year, and reporting
that well-financed conservative forces had also targeted leading jurists in North Caro-
lina and Ohio as well, emphasizing their judicial records on the death penalty and
drugs, among other issues). See generally Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational
Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 239, 271-73 (1994) (reprinting Chief Justice Exum's remarks made as part of
an ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities program) (noting that even
a recent unanimous decision reversing a death sentence was prominently criticized in
the newspaper).
136 Dolan & Irwin, supra note 135, at 18.
17 Id.
138 Electing Judges Is Poor Policy, Overton Tells Panel, FLA. B. NEws, May 1, 1989,
at 4.
139 Motion to Disqualify Present and Former Members of Jefferson Circuit Court
and Jefferson District Court and to Obtain Appointment of a Special Judge from
Outside Jefferson County 3-4, Commonwealth v. Bard, No. 93CR2373 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
Jefferson County Nov. 9, 1993) (on fie with the Boston University Law Review).
140 Id. at 5.
141 Id. at 3. Defense counsel responded by filing a motion to recuse all members of
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a lower court judge who was a candidate for circuit court in Alabama,
was appointed to preside at a capital trial that began just two weeks
before he stood for election. 142 Austin refused to continue the case even
though the defense lawyer sought a continuance because he was suffering
from a serious infection that was a complication of polio. 1" In addition,
the defense sought to disqualify Austin because he was running a "law
and order" campaign for judge and would appear on the ballot in just two
weeks.'" Austin denied both motions."4 The denial of the continuance
was front-page news in the two local newspapers the weekend before trial
began." The denial of a motion to recuse Austin and the denial of a
change of venue were front-page news the following week as jury selec-
tion began."47 Austin presided over the trial, and the jury convicted and
the court. As a result of defense counsel's opposition, the judge who was on the
impending ballot did not preside at the arraignment. Id. at 6.
142 Record at 159-69, Adkins v. State, No. CC 88-22 (Ala. Cir. Ct. St. Clair County
1988) (on file with the Boston University Law Review), aff'd, 600 So. 2d 1054 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990), aff'd in part and remanded, 600 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. 1992). The trial
began on October 24, 1988; the election was held on November 8. Austin, who was a
district court judge, sought to move up to the circuit court, the highest trial-level court
in Alabama. Id. at 1061-62. Austin was the Democratic nominee for the circuit court
position. His Republican opponent was a former FBI agent who had served eight
years as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama and eight years as
county solicitor. Tuesday Means the End of Politicking, ST. CLAIR NEws-AEGIS
(Ala.), Nov. 6, 1988, at 1A, 5A.
143 Adkins v. State, 600 So. 2d 1054, 1060 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), aff'd in part and
remanded, 600 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. 1992).
144 Id. at 1061-62; see also Record at 161-62, Adkins (No. CC 88-22). One of Aus-
tin's newspaper advertisements quoted Alabama Governor Guy Hunt as saying,
"Elect judges on their qualifications... It makes no difference whether a judge called
upon to hand down a death sentence to a murderer is a Republican or a Democrat."
How Do You Elect Good Judges?, S. DEMOCRAT (Oneonta, Ala.), Nov. 2, 1988, at B-
6 (advertisement for Bob Austin for Circuit Judge) (omission in original).
145 See Adkins, 600 So. 2d at 1060-63 (affirming the denial of the motions). During
jury selection, defense counsel pointed out to Judge Austin that he had excused jurors
who had less serious health problems than defense counsel. Id.; see also Record at
163, Adkins (No. CC 88-22).
146 Kelly Bryan, Adkins' Trial Will Start on Schedule, ST. CLAIR NEWS-AEGIS
(Ala.), Oct. 23, 1988, at 1A (reporting that District Judge Bob Austin, who was presid-
ing over the case by special appointment, had denied the motion for a continuance);
Carol Pappas, Ricky Adkins to Go on Trial Monday; Continuance Denied, DAILY
HOME (Talladega, Ala.), Oct. 22, 1988, at 1 (reporting that Austin denied the continu-
ance and a motion to suppress statements).
147 Carol Pappas, Jury Selection to Begin Today in Adkins Capital Murder Trial,
DAILY HOME (Talladega, Ala.), Oct. 25, 1988, at 1 (reporting that defense counsel
cited Judge Austin's "current political campaign for circuit judge" and "speculated
that the judge may not be able to give the case a fair and impartial hearing"); Scottie
Vickery, Murder Trial Won't Be Moved, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 25, 1988, at 1E
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recommended the death penalty before the election. Austin won the
election, and, after being sworn in as circuit judge, followed the jury's
recommendation and imposed the death penalty.14a
A judge's votes in capital cases can threaten his or her elevation to a
higher court. No matter how well qualified a judge may be, perceived
"softness" on crime or on the death penalty may have consequences not
only for the judge, but also for those who would nominate or vote to
confirm the judge for another court. For example, in 1992 groups cam-
paigned against the retention of Florida Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett
for the Florida Supreme Court because of her votes in capital cases. 149
Then in 1994 Barkett's nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit came under fire because of her record on capital punish-
ment during nine years on the Florida Supreme Court.15 After a long
delay, the Senate finally confirmed Barkett by a vote of sixty-one to
thirty-seven. 151
Despite Barkett's confirmation to the Eleventh Circuit, campaigns
against her and other judges tagged as "soft on crime" continued. Bill
Frist, in his successful campaign to unseat Tennessee Senator Jim Sasser,
attacked Sasser for voting for Barkett and for having recommended the
nomination of a federal district judge who, two months before the elec-
tion, granted habeas corpus relief to a death-sentenced man.' 52 Frist
appeared at a news conference with the sister of the victim in the case in
which habeas relief had been granted. 5 ' After the victim's sister criti-
cized Sasser for recommending U.S. District Judge John Nixon for the
federal bench, Frist said that Sasser's vote to confirm Judge Barkett
showed that he "still hasn't learned his lesson.' ' 54
In Virginia, challenger Oliver North attacked Senator Charles Robb
(reporting the denial of change of venue and that Judge Austin was running for circuit
judge in the November election).
148 Marie West Cromer, Newly Sworn Judge Metes Death to Adkins, BIRMINGHAM
POsT-HERALD, Nov. 22, 1988, at 1D.
I49 Lucy Morgan, Persistence Marks Barkett Fray, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 21,
1992, at 1B (describing how the National Rifle Association and other groups vigor-
ously lobbied against Barkett in her retention election because of her alleged softness
on crime, despite the fact that she voted with the court's majority 91% of the time).
150 See, e.g., Jeanne Cummings, Republicans Grill Clinton Nominee; Senators Hone
In on Death Penalty Views, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 4, 1994, at A10 (noting how
conservatives accused the judge of being too "soft on crime," and criticized her opin-
ions on the death penalty, among other issues).
151 Craig Crawford, Senate Confirms Florida Chief Justice Barkett for Federal
Judgeship, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 1994, at Al (noting that the Florida Chief
Justice's Senate confirmation for the federal judgeship sparked the most heated
debate so far over President Clinton's bench nominees).
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for voting to confirm the nomination of Judge Barkett, and of Judge H.
Lee Sarokin's elevation to the Third Circuit.1 5 Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy's opponent attacked him in an advertisement for voting to confirm
Barkett; the advertisement described Barkett as a judge who tried "to
block the death penalty for a man convicted of murdering two police-
men" because of her vote in a case while a justice on the Florida Supreme
Court.15 Senator Diane Feinstein was also attacked for voting for Bar-
kett: Challenger Michael Huffington's advertisements described Judge
Barkett as having overturned the death penalty "even more than Rose
Bird.' 1 7 A Huffington television commercial concluded by stating,
"Feinstein judges let killers live after victims died."' 58 In full-page news-
paper advertisements, the Huffington campaign described the grisly facts
of three capital cases in which Barkett had voted to reverse. 15 9 None of
the advertisements attacking Barkett mentioned the legal basis for her
decision or that she had voted to uphold more death sentences than she
voted to reverse.' 60
Although pro-death-penalty campaigns are not always successful in
defeating judges, even the threat of such a campaign may intimidate a
judge. Challenges also make retaining a judgeship more expensive than it
would otherwise be,1 ' thereby forcing a candidate to raise more money
and contributing to the perception that those who contribute to judicial
campaigns can get more justice than others.'62 One of the saddest and
115 On the Trail, HOUSTON POST, Oct. 27, 1994, at A-9.
156 Scott Lehigh & Frank Phillips, Romney, Kennedy Air Another Round of Attack
Ads, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 21.
157 David Lesher, Huffington Attacks Rival on Judges, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994,
at A3. Huffington also criticized Feinstein for voting to confirm Judge Sarokin's ele-
vation, charging that Sarokin once voted to free a "cop killer" without noting that the
defendant's conviction was overturned because the prosecution withheld evidence.
Id. at A23; see also William Endicott, 'Feinstein's Judges': A False Link, L.A. DAILY
J., Oct. 19, 1994, at 6 (commenting that Huffington's advertisements regarding Fein-
stein's votes for Barkett and Sarokin were both "irresponsible and untruthful").
158 Lesher, supra note 157.
159 Here Are the Facts in a REAL Murder Case. See if You Agree with the Judge's
Decision, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at 17A (advertisement).
160 Lesher, supra note 157; see also Endicott, supra note 157.
161 See, e.g., Mark A. Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional
Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Aris-
ing from Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382
(1987) (noting that regardless of which electoral system a state uses to select judges,
the candidate will always have to raise money); see also Robert F. Utter, Selection and
Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REV. 839, 845 (1973) (noting that in
recent Washington Supreme Court elections, the campaign forced some judges to use
most of the proceeds from the sale of their homes to pay for the extraordinary cam-
paign costs).
162 See, e.g., Cornyn, supra note 90, at 378 (Comyn, a justice of the Texas Supreme
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most recent examples is the bitter campaign waged for chief justice of
Alabama's supreme court in 1994. The challenger accused the incumbent
of shaking down attorneys who had cases before the court for contribu-
tions, while the incumbent ran advertisements in which the father of a
murder victim accused the challenger of being an accomplice to the
murder.1
63
Whether the "hydraulic pressure" of public opinion that Justice
Holmes once described6 4 and the political incentives accompanying it
are appropriate considerations for publicly elected prosecutors is doubt-
ful, 165 but clearly such considerations have no place in the exercise of the
judicial function.' Yet in jurisdictions where judges stand for election-
often with the prosecution in a position tantamount to that of a running
mate-judges are subject to the same pressures. As a result of the
increasing prominence of the death penalty in judicial elections as well as
Court, stating that "[t]he gravest concern that inheres in the elective system... is that
judicial candidates are compelled to raise campaign funds: money and judges simply
do not mix."); Orrin W. Johnson & Laura J. Urbis, Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gath-
ering Storm?, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 525, 545-52 (1992) (discussing the rising cam-
paign costs in Texas judicial elections); Utter, supra note 161, at 843-44 (noting that
lawyers who support the victors or the losers in a political campaign subsequently
have reason to question the legitimacy of judgments made by judges). A related
problem is the efforts of interest groups-such as personal-injury lawyers as well as
insurance and business concerns-to fund the campaigns of preferred candidates who
will support their interests on the bench. The perceived results of such interest-group
domination in Texas judicial elections was described by one commentator as follows:
The Texas Supreme Court in a virtuoso performance of judicial activism has, in
recent years, ignored precedent, invalidated on Texas constitutional grounds
long-accepted legislative enactments, interpreted Texas statutes so as to render
- them meaningless, and glossed over and misinterpreted the fact findings of trial
judges, all in the pursuit of desired results.... Case by case results-oriented
decisions have replaced the rule of law.
Robert D'Agostino, The Decline of the Law in the Texas Supreme Court, 2 BENCH-
MARK 171, 171 (1986). See generally Stephen J. Adler, The Texas Bench: Anything
Goes, Am. LAW., Apr. 1986, at 11.
163 Bill Poovey, Hooper Criticizes Chief Justice for Soliciting from Lawyers, TUSCA-
LOOSA NEWS, July 20, 1994, at 8B; Phillip Rawls, Justice Race Another Political Brawl,
COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Ga.), Dec. 10, 1994, at B-2.
164 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the judiciary must construe a statute that has generated
immediate and overwhelming public interest with a sense of natural interpretation
that one would use if the same question arose in a similar act that had not elicited any
public attention).
165 See supra note 118.
166 The judge's responsibility is to "hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the State and the accused." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); see discussion
of this case infra text accompanying notes 318-22; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CoNDucr Canon 3B(2) (1990) (stating that a judge "should not be swayed by partisan
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism").
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other campaigns for public office, judges are well aware of the conse-
quences to their careers of unpopular decisions in capital cases.
III. THE IMPACT ON THE IMPARTIALITY OF JUDGES
The political liability facing judges who enforce the Bill of Rights in
capital cases undermines the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the state judiciary. Judicial candidates who promise to base their rulings
on "common sense,"1 67 unencumbered by technicalities," s8 essentially
promise to ignore constitutional limits on the process by which society
may extinguish the life of one of its members. Justice Byron White once
observed, "If [for example,] a judge's ruling for the defendant ... may
determine his fate at the next election, even though his ruling was
affirmed and is unquestionably right, constitutional protections would be
subject to serious erosion.' 69 Justice William Brennan noted that the
risk of a biased judge is "particularly acute"'170 in capital cases:
Passions, as we all know, can run to the extreme when the State tries
one accused of a barbaric act against society, or one accused of a
crime that-for whatever reason-inflames the community. Pres-
sures on the government to secure a conviction, to "do something,"
can overwhelm even those of good conscience. When prosecutors
and judges are elected, or when they harbor political ambitions, such
pressures are particularly dangerous. 171
Rulings in a publicized case can have major political effects, such as loss
167 See, e.g., George Skelton, Governor Pledges Common-Sense Court, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1987, at 13, 16 (quoting California Governor George Deukmejian's
inaugural promise that "all of my appointees to our courts will be common-sense
judges who embody the qualities of experience, fairness, integrity and intelligence.")
Alluding to the Bird Court's overturning of death penalty sentences, Deukmejian also
asserted that the voters "told us again ... that life is sacred and that we must do
everything we can to protect the lives of innocent citizens." Id.; see also supra text
accompanying note 130.
168 There appear to be few candidates for judicial office who share the courage of
former Nebraska Supreme Court Justice Norman Krivosha, who once said that he was
"eager to respond when the public complained about judges 'getting crooks off on
technicalities.' I studied those technicalities in school.., they were (portions of) the
Constitution of the United States." Sheila Macmanus, Changes in Code of Judicial
Conduct, Judicial Campaigns and Alcohol Abuse Among Topics Debated at 11th
National Conference, 72 JUDICATURE 185, 185 (1988) (quoting Justice Norman
Krivosha, Address Opening the l1th National Conference for Judicial Conduct Orga-
nizations (Sept. 1988)).
169 Ruth Marcus, Justice White Criticizes Judicial Elections, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
1987, at A5.
170 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17' Id. (citations omitted).
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of one's position or any hope of promotion, and judges are aware of this
as they make controversial decisions, particularly in capital cases.
The American Bar Association's Commission on Professionalism
found that "judges are far less likely to... take ... tough action if they
must run for reelection or retention every few years."' 172 In no other area
of American law are so many tough decisions presented as in a capital
case. And no other cases demonstrate so clearly the validity of the ABA
Commission's finding.
A judge who faces election is more likely to sentence a defendant to
death than a jury that heard the same evidence. In some instances, polit-
ical considerations make it virtually impossible for judges to enforce the
constitutional protections to a fair trial for the accused, such as granting a
change of venue or continuance, or suppressing evidence. Judges have
failed miserably to enforce the most fundamental right of all, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, in capital cases. And many judges routinely
abdicate their judicial responsibility and allow the lawyers for the state to
write their orders resolving disputed factual and legal issues in capital
cases.
A. Overrides of Jury Sentences
Four states-Alabama, Florida, Indiana, and Delaware-permit a
judge to override a jury's sentence of life imprisonment and impose the
death penalty. 17 Alabama judges, who face partisan elections every six
years, 74 have overridden jury sentences of life without parole and
imposed the death penalty forty-seven times, but have vetoed only five
jury recommendations of death.'75 Between 1972 and early 1992, Florida
trial judges, who face contested elections every six years, imposed death
sentences over 134 jury recommendations of life imprisonment, but over-
rode only fifty-one death recommendations.' 76 Between 1980 and early
1994, Indiana judges, who face retention elections every six years,
imposed death sentences over eight jury recommendations of life impris-
onment, but overrode only four death recommendations to impose
172 American Bar Ass'n, Report of Commission on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D.
243, 293 (1986).
173 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)
(Supp. 1994); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of judicial overrides).
174 ALA. CODE § 17-2-7 (1987).
175 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1040 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recounting Alabama override statistics compiled by the Alabama Prison Project).
176 Id. at 1040 n.8 (citing Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello, Death-to-Life
Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
195, 196, 210-11 (1992)).
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sentences of life imprisonment.177 Delaware did not adopt the override
until 1991,178 and that state's judges do not stand for election;1 79 the first
seven times judges used it, they overrode jury recommendations of death
and imposed life sentences. 180
Indeed, the sentencing decisions of some judges are a foregone conclu-
sion. Members of the U.S. Supreme Court have noticed the tendency of
Jacksonville, Florida judge Hudson Olliff to override jury sentences of life
imprisonment and impose death.181 An override could also be antici-
pated from another Florida circuit judge, William Lamar Rose, who pro-
tested the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1972 finding the death
penalty unconstitutional8 2 by slinging a noose over a tree limb on the
courthouse lawn."a In Alabama, three judges account for fifteen of the
forty-seven instances in which jury sentences of life imprisonment were
overridden and death imposed.' 84
Commenting on judicial overrides of jury decisions, Justice Stevens has
observed:
[E]lected judges too often appear to listen [to] the many voters who
generally favor capital punishment but who have far less information
about a particular trial than the jurors who have sifted patiently
through the details of the relevant and admissible evidence. How
else do we account for the disturbing propensity of elected judges to
impose the death sentence time after time notwithstanding a jury's
177 Id. at 1040 n.8 (citing Memorandum from Paula Sites, Legal Director, Indiana
Public Defender Council, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 8, 1994) (on file with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court)).
178 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1994).
179 See supra note 83.
180 Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death
Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. L. REV. 5, 11 n.52 (1994).
181 Barclary v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 980-81 & 981 n.12 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (observing Judge Olliff's use of the same boilerplate language in three differ-
ent cases in overriding jury sentences and imposing the death penalty).
182 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
183 VON DREHLE, supra note 48, at 414-18 (describing Judge Rose's override in
favor of the death sentence in the case of Doug McCray, and the eventual reversal of
that conviction after 17 years in the Florida state courts).
184 Statistics compiled by the Alabama Prison Project (Nov. 29, 1994) (lodged with
the clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995))
(showing that six of the overrides were by Judge Ferrill McRae; five were by Judge
Randall Thomas, who overrode the jury and imposed death on Louise Harris, the
petitioner in Harris v. Alabama, and four were by Judge Braxtron L. Kittrell, Jr.; see
also Amended Motion for Recusal 7-8, Whisenhant v. State, No. CC 77-697 (Ala. Cir.
Ct. Mobile County Feb. 7, 1991) (on file with the Boston University Law Review)
(showing that although there are nine circuit court judges in Mobile, Judge McRae
had presided over 30% of the capital cases because he assigned a large number of
such cases to himself).
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recommendation of life?185
Justice Stevens has also noted that jurors, even those who support candi-
dates who are "tough on crime," are not subject to the same political
pressures as judges:
I am convinced that our jury system provides reliable insulation
against the passions of the polity. Voting for a political candidate
who vows to be "tough on crime" differs vastly from voting at the
conclusion of an actual trial to condemn a specific individual to
death. Jurors' responsibilities terminate when their case ends; they
answer only to their own consciences; they rarely have any concern
about possible reprisals after their work is done. More importantly,
they focus their attention on a particular case involving the fate of
one fellow citizen, rather than on a generalized remedy for a global
category of faceless violent criminals who, in the abstract, may
appear unworthy of life.' 8
Justice Stevens was a single voice. The other eight members of the
Supreme Court, without even addressing his concern about the political
influences on jury overrides, held in Harris v. Alabama that Alabama
judges could continue to override jury sentences in capital cases, simply
relying on the Court's earlier decision allowing judicial overrides by
judges in Florida.187
B. Failure to Protect the Constitutional Rights of the Accused
The Bill of Rights guarantees an accused certain procedural safeguards,
regardless of whether those safeguards are supported by popular senti-
ment at the time of the trial, in order to protect the accused from the
passions of the moment. But nothing protects an elected judge who
enforces the Constitution from an angry constituency that is concerned
only about the end result of a ruling and may have little understanding of
what the law requires. Judges who must keep one eye on the next elec-
tion often cannot resist the temptation to wink at the Constitution.
As previously discussed, some judges have scheduled capital cases for
before an election or have refused to continue a case until after an elec-
tion in order to gain the publicity and other political benefits that accom-
185 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 713 n.4 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that juries make decisions based on community values
more reliably than do judges because juries more accurately reflect the composition
and experiences of a community as a whole).
186 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995) (dissenting opinion).
187 Id. at 1034-36 (O'Connor, J.) (relying on Spaziano v. Florida). Justice Stevens
also pointed out the political pressures on Florida's elected trial judges in his dissent
in Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 486-87.
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pany presiding over such a trial.' 8 In these situations, the judge is under
immense pressure to make rulings that favor the prosecution because an
unpopular decision will quickly turn the anticipated benefits of associa-
tion with the case into a major liability that could result in defeat in the
election.
But even in less politically charged circumstances, judges face conflicts
between personal political considerations and their duty to enforce the
law in making decisions on a wide range of issues. For example, among
the many decisions by trial judges to which reviewing courts defer are
determinations under Batson v. Kentucky' 89 of whether the use of per-
emptory jury strikes was racially motivated. 190 As previously discussed,
many judges are former prosecutors. Before going to the bench, a judge
may have hired the prosecutor appearing before him as an assistant.
Even if the judge is not personally close to the prosecutor, she may be
dependent upon the prosecutor's support in the next election to remain in
office. 191 Therefore, it may be personally difficult or politically impossi-
ble for a judge to reject a the prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a
minority juror. 19 2
Judges may find it difficult to make other decisions required by law and
remain popular with the voters. The Mississippi Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the discretion to grant a change of venue places a
"burden" on the trial judge because "the judge serves at the will of the
citizenry of the district... [and] might be perceived as implying that a fair
trial cannot be had among his or her constituents and neighbors."' 93
Even when a judge grants a change of venue, the objective may not be
to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial. The clerk of a circuit
188 See supra parts II.B-C.
189 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
190 Id. at 98; Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (holding that a prosecutor's
explanation that a black juror was stricken because he had long, unkempt hair, a
moustache, and a beard was a "race-neutral" reason, and deferring to the state court's
finding that the prosecutor did not have a discriminatory intent).
191 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (describing how Houston District
Attorney Johnny B. Holmes, dissatisfied with a judge's rulings in two cases, helped
cause the judge's defeat by causing congestion of the judge's docket).
192 For a discussion of the types of reasons that trial courts often accept when rul-
ing on Batson claims, see United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1159-63 (3d Cir.
1989) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (citing cases and articles to demonstrate that in
cases since Batson "superficial or almost frivolous excuses for peremptory challenges
with racial overtones have been proffered and accepted," including "reasons that are
clearly, but subtly, racial in nature"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); Kenneth B.
Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1993); Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses,
Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 229
(1993).
193 Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1209 (Miss. 1985).
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court in Florida revealed several years after the death sentence was
entered against Raleigh Porter that the presiding judge, Richard M. Stan-
ley, had told the clerk that he was changing the venue to another county
that had "good, fair minded people here who would listen and consider
the evidence and then convict the son-of-a-bitch. Then, Judge Stanley
said, he would send Porter to the chair.' 194 The jury returned the
expected verdict and Judge Stanley, wearing brass knuckles and a gun at
the sentencing hearing, sentenced Porter to death.1
95
In Coleman v. Kemp,'96 a Georgia trial judge denied a change of venue
from a small rural community inundated with media coverage of six
murders committed by Maryland prison escapees. The media coverage
included strong anti-defendant sentiments, such as those of the local sher-
iff, who publicly expressed his desire to "pre-cook [the defendants] sev-
eral days, just keep them alive and let them punish," and of an editorial
writer who compared the defendants to rattlesnakes and rabid dogs.' 97 A
local citizen who served as a juror in one of the cases testified that news
of the murders spread in the small community "like fire in a broom sage,"
that "everybody was so excited and upset over it," and that the sentiment
of "everybody" prior to trial was "fry 'em, electrocute 'em." 198 The
elected trial judge, faced with a choice between his community's urge for
a quick and violent response to the crime and the defendants' constitu-
tional rights, refused to grant a change of venue. The local jury convicted
the defendants and the elected Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
convictions. 199
The difficult job of setting aside the convictions obtained at three trials
that lacked any semblance of fairness was left to the judges serving life
tenure on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2"'
The political consequences of protecting the rights of the accused became
even more apparent after the grant of habeas corpus relief. Citizens
throughout Georgia presented petitions containing over 100,000 signa-
194 Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1995) (remanding for a hear-
ing on whether the petitioner could establish "cause" for failing to present previously
his claim that he was denied a fair and impartial judge).
196 Id. at 1488.
196 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
197 Id. at 1493, 1518. For a detailed account of the massive pretrial publicity and
community attitudes, see id. at 1491-1537.
198 Id. at 1533-34.
199 See Dungee v. State, 227 S.E.2d 746 (Ga.) (per curiam) (affirming George
Dungee's death sentence), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); Isaacs v. State, 226 S.E.2d
922 (Ga.) (per curiam) (affirming Carl Isaacs's death sentence), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
986 (1976); Coleman v. State, 226 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. 1976) (affirming Wayne Coleman's
death sentence), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 909 (1977).
200 Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1543 (granting habeas relief to Wayne Coleman); Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482, 1487 (11th Cir. 1985) (granting habeas relief to Carl Isaacs and
George Dungee), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
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tures to the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee's Sub-
committee on Courts, urging it to impeach the three members of the
Court of Appeals panel who voted unanimously for the new trials.2" 1
A judge's decision to allow electronic and photographic coverage of
court proceedings may also be influenced by political considerations at
the expense of the constitutional rights of the defendant. In Estes v.
Texas,20 2 the Supreme Court described the potential for abuse of televis-
ing judicial proceedings:
Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psycho-
logical reactions as laymen. Telecasting is particularly bad where the
judge is elected . . . . The telecasting of a trial becomes a political
weapon, which, along with other distractions inherent in broadcast-
ing, diverts his attention from the task at hand-the fair trial of the
accused.203
The Court later noted that if one judge in a district allows telecasting,
then other judges in that district are almost obliged to do the same-
"[e]specially... where the judge is selected at the ballot box., 20 4 As a
result of the greater allowance of cameras in court, a judge or prosecutor
can film his or her campaign commercials using real defendants.
Judges elected at the ballot box are under even greater political pres-
sure in some of the other decisions that they make. A good example is
Georgia's postconviction relief system. Voters elect two superior court
judges in Georgia's Flint Judicial Circuit, comprising four rural counties.
The Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, the prison that houses
Georgia's death row, is a major employer in the circuit. Because state
postconviction actions must be brought in the county of the prison in
which the inmate is incarcerated, local judges preside over a large
number of those actions. In the last ten years, the two local judges-two
former prosecutors-have never once granted habeas corpus relief to an
inmate sentenced to death.20 5 In reviewing these cases, however, the fed-
eral courts have found constitutional violations requiring that either the
convictions or sentences be vacated in almost two-thirds of the cases.20 6
Political considerations are also inescapable for appellate judges who
must stand for election or retention. Former California Supreme Court
201 Robert Doherty, House Panel Says Impeachment of Judges Not Appropriate in
Alday Case, UPI, Oct. 16, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
202 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
203 Id. at 548.
204 Id. at 549.
205 In a few cases judges visiting from other parts of the state have granted relief.
206 The authors reviewed the cases of 75 individuals sentenced to death in Georgia
in which the federal courts reviewed petitions for habeas corpus relief after the Flint
Judicial Circuit Superior Court denied relief. In 57 of those cases, the federal court
ordered either a new trial or a new sentencing proceeding. In the remaining 18 cases,
the federal court denied all relief.
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Justice Joseph R. Grodin described the tension that he felt when deciding
cases. He admitted that it was difficult to assure himself that his vote had
been entirely on the merits of the case and in no way related to the case's
possible electoral implications.2" 7 A Georgia Supreme Court justice
acknowledged that the elected justices of that court may have overlooked
errors, leaving federal courts to remedy them via habeas corpus, because
"[federal judges] have lifetime appointments. Let them make the hard
decisions."2 "8
The ouster of Justice Grodin and two other justices for their alleged
softness on the death penalty has produced a California Supreme Court
that is markedly more likely to affirm the convictions and sentences of
capital defendants. In the last five years, the Court's affirmance rate in
capital cases has climbed to almost 97%, one of the highest rates in the
country.20 9 A group of professors at California law schools criticized the
court for its sometimes sloppy and unclear opinions and its willingness
to allow errors in the trial court to go uncorrected in capital cases. In
the words of one professor, "I think they're doing the job they're
supposed to do. The people wanted death. They got some justices who
read the election returns and the law is certainly indeterminate enough in
many cases that it can be read the way the California Supreme Court is
207 Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective
on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988) (echoing the
admission of Justice Grodin's former colleague on the California Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Otto Kaus, that his votes in critical cases may have been subconsciously influ-
enced by his awareness that the outcomes could affect upcoming judicial elections).
208 Katie Wood, Not Just a Rubber Stamp Anymore, FULTON CoUNTv DAILY REP.
(Ga.), Jan. 25, 1993, at 1, 5. Although the justice maintained that the Georgia
Supreme Court is now more willing to enforce the Constitution than it had been pre-
viously, the state's attorney general has made it clear that some of the members of the
court may pay at the polls as a result. Attorney General Michael Bowers has called
the court "the most liberal in the country" and asserted that the court, led by Justice
Robert Benham, an African-American, is on a path to abolish the death penalty. Bill
Shipp, The State Scene: Benham and the Rare High Court Fuss, MONROE COUNTY
REC. (Ga.), Apr. 5, 1995, at 4 (opinion column circulated in many Georgia newspa-
pers). Although no objective observer would share Bowers' characterization of the
Georgia Supreme Court or its purpose with regard to the death penalty, the com-
ments by Bowers, who recently changed party affiliation from Democrat to Republi-
can, served notice that Benham may be challenged in 1996 by a Republican candidate.
Peter Mantius, Speaking His Mind A Decision that Robert Benham Wrote Last Year
Could Bring Conservative Opposition at the Polls, ATLANTA CONST., July 3, 1995, at
2B.
209 Dolan, State High Court Is Strong Enforcer of Death Penalty, supra note 7, at
Al; see also Gerald F. Uelmen, How the Justices Stack Up, L.A. DAILY J., June 4,
1993, Report at 7, 10 (observing only five reversals out of 89 cases decided between
1990 and 1993).
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reading it."21
The price paid for an elected judiciary in Alabama, California, Georgia,
Texas, and other states has been the corruption of the judges and the
courts of those states. Once a judge makes a decision influenced by polit-
ical considerations, in violation of the oath he or she has taken to uphold
the law, both the judge and the judicial system are diminished, not only in
that case, but in all cases. The realization that a ruling in a case was made
with more of an eye toward the next election than the requirements of
the law can irreparably damage a judge's self-perception and commit-
ment to justice. After the first such breach of one's judicial responsibility,
it is more easily repeated in future cases. Once the public understands
that courts are basing their rulings on political considerations-even
when the courts are giving the voters the results they want, as the Califor-
nia Supreme Court is now doing-it undermines the legitimacy and the
moral authority of courts as enforcers of the Constitution and law.
C. Appointment and Tolerance of Incompetent Counsel for Indigent
Persons
Judges often fail to enforce the most fundamental protection of an
accused, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by assigning an
inexperienced or incompetent lawyer to represent the accused. As
a result of appointments by state court judges, defendants in capital cases
have been represented by lawyers-and in at least one instance a third-
year law student 211-trying their first cases212 or with little or no experi-
ence in trying serious cases, 213 lawyers who were senile or intoxi-
210 Claire Cooper, Experts Rap Court on Death Penalty Rulings, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 20, 1988, at Al (quoting Professor Gary Goodpaster).
211 See Bright, supra note 39, at 1845 n.56 (1994) (describing a Mississippi case in
which a third-year law student and an attorney represented a capital defendant).
212 See, e.g., Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing
the adequacy of a capital defendant's represenation when the attorney had passed the
bar exam just six months prior to his appointment as defendant's counsel, had not
taken any classes in criminal law, criminal procedure, or trial advocacy during law
school, and had never tried a jury or felony trial), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct.
1837 (1993); see also Bright, supra note 39, at 1845 n.56 (listing numerous other exam-
ples of the inexperience of court-appointed counsel in capital cases).
213 See, e.g., Parker v. State, 587 So. 2d 1072, 1100-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)
(upholding the trial court's refusal to allow an appointed lawyer to withdraw from a
capital case despite the lawyer's asserted inexperience in defense of criminal cases);
State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 427 (La. 1993) (reporting that three of the four attor-
neys appointed to defend two defendants were "civil practitioners with little criminal
law experience"); Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1204 (Miss. 1985) (finding no
error when the accused was represented by one attorney with only one prior criminal
case and another who was a recent graduate from law school with no criminal or civil
trial experience, and the trial court denied their motion to withdraw based upon com-
plexity of the case).
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cated214 or under the influence of drugs215 while trying the cases, lawyers
who were completely ignorant of the law and procedures governing a
capital trial, 1 6 lawyers who used racial slurs to refer to their clients,217
lawyers who handled cases without any investigative or expert assistance,
lawyers who slept2 1 or were absent during crucial parts of the trial,219
lawyers who lacked even the most minimal skills, lawyers who filed one-
page to ten-page briefs on direct appeal,22° and other equally incompe-
214 See People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440-41 (Cal. 1989) (describing how coun-
sel, an alcoholic, was arrested en route to court one morning and found to have a
blood-alcohol level of 0.27 mg/i; nevertheless, the court was unwilling to create a
rebuttable presumption against the competence of attorneys under the influence of
alcohol).
215 See Bright, supra note 39, at 1859 (recounting the case of John Young, who was
executed in Georgia after being represented by an attorney whose dependence on
amphetamines and other drugs affected his ability to concentrate and who pleaded
guilty to state and federal drug charges a few weeks after his client had been sen-
tenced to death).
216 See, e.g., Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1983)
(describing a Florida capital case during which the trial judge had to explain to
defendant's attorney in a conference in the judge's chambers that the attorney should
present mitigating evidence, not argument, during the penalty phase of the trial, to
which the attorney replied, "Judge, I'm at a loss. I really don't know what to do in
this type of proceeding. If I'd been through one, I would, but I've never handled one
except this time."), vacated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984); see also Bright, supra
note 39, at 1842 n.49 (listing numerous other examples of the defense counsel's lack of
familiarity with law and procedure).
217 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982) (reporting that
during the sentencing phase of Terry Goodwin's capital trial, his attorney described
Goodwin to the jury as "a little old nigger boy"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983);
see also Bright, supra note 39, at 1843 n.51 (citing other uses of racial slurs).
218 Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About Sys-
tem, WALL STREET J., Sept. 7, 1994, at 1 (describing several reports of lawyers sleep-
ing during trials); John Makeig, Asleep on the Job; Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Said,
HoUSTON CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35 (describing a defendant's complaint that his
lawyer slept during the trial).
219 See House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870
(1984) ("During the state's direct examination of Sgt. Fitzgerald, Ben Atkins, then
lead counsel, was not in the courtroom, but outside parking his automobile. Despite
this absence, Ben Atkins conducted the cross-examination of Sgt. Fitzgerald, having
never heard his direct testimony.").
220 See, e.g., Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 (11th Cir. 1984) (reviewing a claim
of ineffective assitance when defense counsel's filed brief containing only five pages of
argument, counsel filed it only in response to threat of sanctions against him, and
counsel failed to file a requested supplemental brief); Banda v. State, 768 S.W.2d 294,
297 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989) (reporting that a court-
appointed counsel only raised a single point of error in a brief whose substantive
portion contained only 150 words); see also Bright, supra note 39, at 1843 n.55 (citing
numerous other examples of grossly inadequate briefs).
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tent lawyers who were deficient in a number of other respects.221
When the community that elects the judge is demanding an execution,
the judge has no political incentive to appoint an experienced lawyer who
will devote large amounts of time to the case and file applications for
expert and investigative assistance, all of which will only increase the cost
of the case for the community. As a result, judges frequently assign law-
yers who are not willing or able to provide a vigorous defense.
For example, judges in Houston, Texas have repeatedly appointed an
attorney who occasionally falls asleep in court, and is known primarily for
hurrying through capital trials like "greased lightning" without much
questioning or making objections.222 Ten of his clients have received
death sentences. 2" Similarly, judges in Long Beach, California, assigned
the representation of numerous indigent defendants to a lawyer who tried
cases in very little time, not even obtaining discovery in some of them.22 '
The attorney has the distinction of having more of his clients sentenced to
death, eight, than any other attorney in California.225
Local elected judges in Georgia have repeatedly refused to appoint for
retrials of capital cases the lawyers who had successfully represented the
defendants in postconviction proceedings," even after the Georgia
Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that counsel familiar with the
case should be appointed.2 7
Local elected judges may base their assignment of counsel to indigent
221 For numerous other examples of instances of inadequate representation by
court-appointed lawyers and the tolerance of such shameful representation by presid-
ing judges and state appellate courts, see Bright, supra note 39, at 1835-43, 1846-49,
1855-66; Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt,
NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 30-44 (examining the quality of representation in six
states).
222 Barrett, supra note 218, at Al. One judge in Harris County, responding to a
capital defendant's complaints about his lawyer sleeping during the trial at which
death was imposed, stated, "The Constitution doesn't say the lawyer has to be
awake." Makeig, supra note 218, at A35.
223 Barrett, supra note 218, at Al.
224 Ted Rohrlick, The Case of the Speedy Attorney, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at
Al. According to a local public defender, judges liked the lawyer, Ron Slick,
"because he was always ready to go to trial, even when it seemed he had inadequate
time to prepare." Id. A substantial number of his clients asked judges to appoint
someone else to defend them, but their motions were denied. Id.
225 Id.
226 Roberts v. State, 438 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Ga. 1994); Davis v. State, 403 S.E.2d 800
(Ga. 1991); Birt v. State, 387 S.E.2d 879, 879-80 (Ga. 1990).
227 Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181, 181 (Ga. 1989) (reversing a trial court's
appointment of two lawyers with no experience in capital punishment litigation; the
lawyers and defendant objected after the trial court refused to appoint previous coun-
sel with death-penalty experience who had won a new trial for the defendant in the
U.S. Supreme Court).
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defendants on political ties or other considerations than the ability of the
lawyer to provide competent representation. A defense attorney in
Cleveland contributes thousands of dollars toward the reelection cam-
paigns of judges and is "notorious for picking up the judges' dinner and
drink tabs. They, in turn, send [the attorney] as much business as he can
handle in the form of case assignments. ' '22 A study of capital cases in
Philadelphia found that "Philadelphia's poor defendants often find them-
selves being represented by ward leaders, ward committeemen, failed
politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders, and contributors to the
judge's election campaign. ''2 1 The lawyer who received the most
appointments one year to homicide cases in Philadelphia was a former
judge whom the state's supreme court removed from the bench for
receiving union money." ° He handled thirty-four murder cases in that
year and submitted bills for $84,650 for fees and expenses.231
As might be expected, treating the assignment of criminal cases as part
of a judicial patronage system does not always result in the best legal
representation. The study of capital cases in Philadelphia found that
"even officials in charge of the system say they wouldn't want to be repre-
sented in Traffic Court by some of the people appointed to defend poor
people accused of murder. ' '1 2
Regardless of the basis for selection, assignment of cases to lawyers by
judges undermines the fairness and integrity of the adversary system in
other ways. Lawyers who owe their livelihood to judicial appointments
may be unwilling to provide zealous representation out of fear that it will
cost them future appointments. So long as this system continues, neither
the judges nor the lawyers are truly independent and able to play their
proper role in the adversary system.
D. Delegating the Judicial Function to the Prosecutor
Many state trial judges engage in the routine practice of adopting, usu-
ally verbatim, judicial orders that prosecutors or attorneys general have
actually written. These orders are not short, routine form orders regard-
ing minor procedural or management matters such as scheduling, but
long and detailed opinions, often over forty pages in length, containing
extensive factual characterizations and legal analysis. Such ghostwritten
orders are not the impartial findings of disinterested judges, but rather
228 James F. McCarty, Law and Disorder with Rumpled Suits and Befuddled Ways,
Thomas Shaughnessy Has Managed to Become the Matlock of Cuyahoga County,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 23, 1994, at 8, 13.
229 See Fredric N. TuIsky, Big-time Trials; Small Time Defenses, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 14, 1992, at Al, AS.
230 Roxanne Patel & Fredric N. Tulsky, The Former City Judge Who Defended 34
Murder Suspects in a Year, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1992, at A8.
231 Id.
232 Tulsky, supra note 229, at A8.
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the briefs of advocates, containing one-sided, exaggerated "findings" that
prosecutors have tailored for strategic advantage on appeal and in post-
conviction review. Besides representing the nadir of judicial indepen-
dence, this practice is a blatant abdication of the judiciary's duty to
safeguard a defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. It
shows an unwillingness of many state court judges to wrestle with the
difficult issues presented and to come to their own determination of the
issues.
A Georgia Superior Court judge denied postconviction relief in a capi-
tal case in 1992 in an order that named a witness who had never testified
in the proceeding or had any relation to the case. 3 This error and the
marked similarity of the order to the Attorney General's brief in the case
led to the discovery that the judge's law clerk had called the assistant
attorney general handling the case and asked for an order denying the
habeas corpus petition. 4 The order had been "spit out by the word
processors at the state attorney general's office without even correcting
spelling errors and other mistakes that originally appeared in the state's
... reply brief. '23 5 The judge signed the order without modification, not
even noticing that he found "irrelevant" the testimony of a witness who
never appeared. Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme Court, in upholding
the denial of relief, accorded the order no less deference than usual,
despite the state's concession that it had written the order, and found
immaterial the order's mistake concerning the witness who never
testified. 36
In 1993, a district court judge in Dallas, Texas, entered a one-page
order adopting the state's response as the court's findings and conclu-
sions, even though the response took the unprecedented position that
procedural default barred a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7
Six days later, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals approved the district
court judge's handling of the case in a standard one-page order." 8 A
circuit judge in Florida recently acknowledged that the "customary prac-
233 Katie Wood, Challenging Ghost-Written Habeas Orders, FULTON CoUNrY
DAILY REP. (Ga.), Nov. 25, 1992, at 1.
234 Id. at 2.
235 Id. at 1.
236 Jefferson v. Zant, 431 S.E.2d 110, 112 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1577
(1994).
237 Order, Lewis v. State, No. W86-73713-H(A) (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dallas County Feb.
10, 1993) (on file with the Boston University Law Review), aff'd, Ex parte Lewis, No.
24,429-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 1993) (per curiam) (on file with the Boston Uni-
versity Law Review). A claim of ineffectiveness could not have been raised previously
because the trial lawyer could not assert his own ineffectiveness.
238 Ex parte Lewis, No. 24,429-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 1993) (on file with the
Boston University Law Review); see also, e.g., Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66, 79
(S.D. Tex. 1992) (finding that in a capital case a Houston judge resolved the merits of
a state habeas corpus petition by signing 35 pages of findings of fact and conclusions
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tice" in capital cases before him was for the prosecutor's office, acting as
"the 'eyes and ears' of the Court," to prepare sentencing orders in capital
cases for him. 9 The Alabama courts recently upheld on appeal a thirty-
four-page order drafted by the assistant attorney general, with the
trial court merely correcting one typographical error and replacing of the
words "dismissed and denied" on the last page with a single
"DENIED."4
Such routine approval of the prosecution's ghostwritten orders has
become the standard practice in Alabama. Trial court judges throughout
Alabama enter orders denying postconviction relief in capital cases that
are virtually identical in structure, language, organization, findings, syn-
tax, and overreaching. These ghostwritten orders are highly argumenta-
tive and notably selective in overemphasizing the state's evidence while
discounting or entirely ignoring the defendant's evidence. For example,
defense counsel's acts and omissions are universally deemed "strate-
gic"-no matter how preposterous such an assertion may be-so as to
defeat a potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strick-
land v. Washington.241 In addition, the ghostwriting assistant attorneys
general also repeatedly "find" that even if defense counsel had presented
certain evidence, it would have made no difference so as to defeat the
prejudice prong of Strickland.42 In one case, when an appointed lawyer
who defended a capital case for only $1000 admitted that it was "malprac-
of law that were "a verbatim adoption of the State's proposed findings and reflect no
independent input from the state district judge").
239 Card v. State, 652 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. 1995) (remanding for an evidentiary
hearing on whether the defendant was denied an independent weighing of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances; the judge stated that he did not dictate findings to
the prosecutors before the sentencing orders were prepared).
240 Compare Opinion and Order (Draft), Grayson v. State, No. CV 86-193 (Ala.
Cir. Ct. Shelby County Jan. 19, 1993) (on file with the Boston University Law Review)
(proposed opinion and order rejecting Grayson's coram nobis petition) with Opinion
and Order, Grayson (No. CV 86-193) (on file with the Boston University Law Review)
[hereinafter Grayson Order] (same order, with the noted alterations), aff'd, No.
CR-92-0875, 1995 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 16 (Jan. 13, 1995).
241 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the legal standards for evaluating a defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment claim that his attorney did not render effective assistance).
The Strickland Court held that "strategic choices made after thorough investigation
... are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judg-
ments support the limitation on investigation." lId at 690-91.
242 The Supreme Court held in Strickland that even if a lawyer's performance was
deficient at trial, relief on ineffectiveness ground was not to be granted unless the
defendant established "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would be different." Id. at 694. The Court added
that "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Id.
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tice" not to consult with an expert about some of the issues in the case,
the order ghostwritten by the assistant attorney general and signed by the
judge never mentioned that testimony or any of the other deficiencies in
counsel's representation.243
Indeed, Alabama prosecutors apparently now feel uncomfortable when
a judge undertakes to decide the case on his own. In one Alabama case
in which the trial judge denied postconviction relief in his own order
before the state submitted one, the state made a motion for additional
findings and submitted findings denying relief on procedural grounds.2'
The assistant attorney general even asked the state appellate court to
delay the briefing schedule on the appeal to give the trial judge time to
sign the state's proposed order.2 45 The trial judge overruled the defend-
ant's objections and entered an order adopting the proposed findings.2z
In the case of Cornelius Singleton, a mentally retarded black man who
was executed after being sentenced to death by an all-white jury, a state
court judge in Mobile signed off on at least four ghostwritten orders.247
243 Grayson Order, supra note 240, passim.
244 See Luke v. State, 484 So. 2d 531, 535 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (recounting the
state's filing of a motion for clarification of the trial court's November 30, 1984 order
denying Luke's coram nobis petition).
25 Motion to Suspend Rules and Change Time Within Which Appellee's Brief
Must Be Filed, Luke v. State, 484 So. 2d 531 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (No. 4-Div. 417)
(on file with the Boston University Law Review).
246 See Order, Luke v. State, No. CC 82-320 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Russell County June 10,
1985) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Luke Order]
(order amending trial court's November 30, 1984 order, which denied Luke's coram
nobis petition, by adding findings of fact regarding that petition), ignored, 484 So. 2d
531, 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (affirming the denial of Luke's coram nobis petition,
but refusing to consider the trial court's June 10, 1985 order in doing so), cert. denied
484 So. 2d 538 (Ala. 1986).
247 Second Amended Sentence Order, Singleton v. State, No. 1 Div. 361, slip op.
app. (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 1984), available in LEXIS, Ala Library, Alcts File),
aff'd, Ex parte Singleton, 465 So. 2d 443 (Ala. 1985); Memorandum Opinion, Single-
ton (No. CC-78-117) (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile County Dec. 26, 1986) (on file with the
Boston University Law Review), appeal dismissed, 492 So. 2d 675 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986); Memorandum Opinion, Singleton (No. CC-78-117) (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile
County July 1, 1988) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter
Third Singleton Order], aff'd, 541 So. 2d 87 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Ex
parte Singleton, 548 So. 2d 167 (Ala. 1989); Order and Opinion, Singleton (No. CC-
78-117) (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile County Nov. 27, 1990) (on file with the Boston Univer-
sity Law Review) [hereinafter Fourth Singleton Order], aff'd, 587 So. 2d 1117 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991). The same judge, FerriUl McRae, has signed off on at least five other
orders that the Alabama Attorney General's -office submitted in other capital cases.
The order sentencing Phillip Tomlin to death, which is appended to the opinion of
the Court of Criminal Appeals in Tomlin v. State, 516 So. 2d 790 app. (Ala. Crim.
App. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Ex parte Tomlin, 516 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 1987), is identical to
the order drafted by the assistant attorney general and submitted to Judge McRae.
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In Singleton's 1983 state postconviction proceeding, the judge signed a
ghostwritten order that went beyond the record to defeat Singleton's
claim of racial discrimination based on the prosecution's striking nine
black jurors to obtain an all-white jury. In applying the standard of
Swain v. Alabama,m the order stated that "[the] Court knows from hav-
ing presided over dozens of cases tried by the two prosecutors who tried
the present case that they did not remove all black veniremen from the
juries in all or even a majority of the cases they tried."249 This finding
was made without evidence. A federal court evaluating the same claim of
a Swain violation in another case involving the same prosecutors based
on evidence found a systematic practice of racial discrimination.25 °
In 1988, the same state trial judge signed another order and memoran-
dum opinion in Singleton's case, the day after receiving that order from
Apparently not aware that the order was prepared by one side, the Court of Criminal
Appeals wrote in its decision that "the very able trial judge [had] prepared and
issued" the order. 516 So. 2d at 791. Subsequently the Alabama Supreme Court
reversed the conviction because of the prosecutor's improper closing arguments. At
the new trial a jury unanimously recommended that the defendant be sentenced to
life imprisonment. Judge McRae then solicited another order from the Alabama
attorney general's office, overriding the jury's verdict and imposing the death penalty;
the judge signed that order. Sentencing Order, State v. Tomlin, No. 89-481 (Ala. Cir.
Ct. Mobile County Apr. 19, 1990) (on fie with the Boston University Law Review).
The Alabama Attorney General's office also wrote the order used by Judge McRae
to sentence Thomas Warren Whisenhant to death in 1987. Compare the Letter from
Ed Carnes, Assistant Attorney General, Alabama, to Ferrill McRae, Judge of the
Alabama Circuit Court for Moblie County (Apr. 14, 1987) (on file with the Boston
University Law Review) (containing, as an enclosure, proposed "Sentence Findings
and Order") with the virtually identical Sentence Findings and Order, State v.
Whisenhant, No. CC-77-697 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile County Apr. 23, 1987) (on file with
the Boston University Law Review), aff'd, 555 So. 2d 219 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
248 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965) (holding that the defendant must show that a prosecu-
tor made race-based peremptory challenges "in case after case, whatever the circum-
stances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim" in order to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination), overruled in part, Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986) (holding that defendant must only show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor used race-based peremp-
tory challenges to exclude veniremen from the defendant's petit jury to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination).
Although the Supreme Court decided Batson before this court rejected Singleton's
purposeful discrimination claim, the court applied the Swain standard because Batson
does not apply retroactively to appellate review of convictions that became final
before the Supreme Court handed down Batson. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255,
258 (1986) (holding Batson nonretroactive).
249 See Memorandum Opinion at 4-5, Singleton (No. CC-78-117) (Ala. Cir. Ct.
Mobile County Dec. 26, 1986) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) (deny-
ing Singleton's coram nobis petition).
250 Jones v. Davis, 906 F.2d 552 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
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the state.25 And then, in November 1990, the judge adopted another
ghostwritten order, forty-seven pages long, without modification.
25 2
Much of the language in this order is identical to the language of an order
signed by a different judge, in another case, in another part of the state,
Holladay v. State."'3 Both cases involved questions of whether the
defendants' rights were violated because of their trial counsel's failure to
present mitigating evidence of the defendants' mental retardation.
254
During postconviction proceedings in each case, the lawyers for the
condemned defendants presented two mental health experts who testified
about the defendants' mental retardation.255 In both cases, the state
relied on Dr. Joe Dixon, a psychologist who does mental examinations on
behalf of the state. 6 The portions of the orders discussing the mental
health evidence closely resemble each other. The courts accepted Dr.
Dixon's testimony in full, yet found the testimony of each of Singleton
and Holladay's mental health experts-one psychiatrist and three psy-
chologists-to be completely lacking credibility.2 57 The order in Single-
ton, signed on November 27, 1990, stated:
This Court credits the testimony of Dr. Dixon and does not credit the
testimony of Dr. Albrecht and Dr. Baroff for a number of reasons.258
The order in Holladay, entered in that case on December 5, 1991, stated:
This Court credits the testimony of Dr. Dixon and does not credit the
testimony of Dr. Fisher and Dr. Norko for a number of reasons.259
The orders then related the reasons for not crediting the defendants'
experts in highly argumentative "findings" regarding the four defense
251 Third Singleton Order, supra note 247.
252 Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247.
253 Order, Holladay v. State, No. CC-86-1057.60ST, (Ala. Cir. Ct. Etowah County
Dec. 5, 1991) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) (denying and dis-
missing coram nobis petition) [hereinafter Holladay Order], aff'd, 629 So. 2d 673
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1208 (1994). Interestingly, the order is
stamped "filed" on two different dates: once when the Capital Litigation Division of
the Attorney General's office filed it as a proposed order, and again when the judge
signed it as the order in the case.
254 Compare Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247, at 35-37 (discussing Single-
ton's mitigating circumstances claim) with Holladay Order, supra note 253, at 28-36
(discussing Holladay's mitigating circumstances claim).
255 Compare Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247, at 10-19, 36 (testimony of
Drs. Albrecht and Baroff) with Holladay Order, supra note 253, at 29-35 (testimony
of Drs. Fisher and Norko).
256 Compare Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247, at 9-19, 36 (testimony of Dr.
Dixon) with Holladay Order, supra note 253, at 29 (same).
257 Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247, at 11-19, 36; Holladay Order, supra
note 253, at 30.
258 Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247, at 11.
259 Holladay Order, supra note 253, at 30.
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witnesses." ° Although such arguments may have been suitable for an
advocate's brief, they certainly had no place in a judicial order. In Hol-
laday, for example, the "findings" were so audacious as to describe testi-
mony by the defense witnesses with the following phrases: "no
credibility," "outrageous," and "without credibility and without merit."2' 1
Such similarities appear in other cases. Courts deny ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims in orders that clearly came off the same word
processor that produced the attorney general's brief. These orders invari-
ably begin with the same summary of the legal standard and end with
similar refrains. For example, compare the following:
These cases provide the framework for analyzing petitioner's inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim. John Gruenewald [sic] represen-
tation of petitioner was not deficient and petitioner was not
prejudiced by his actions at trial.262
These cases provide the framework for analyzing petitioner's inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim. Jock Michael Smith's representa-
tion of petitioner was not deficient and petitioner was not prejudiced
by his actions at trial.
2 61
These cases provide the framework for analyzing petitioner's inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims. Hank Fannin and R.D. Pitt's
representation of petitioner was not deficient and petitioner was not
prejudiced by his [sic] actions at trial.'
In each order a description of the court-appointed lawyer followed, with
260 See Fourth Singleton Order, supra note 247, at 11-13, 16, 36-37 (criticizing Drs.
Albrecht and Baroff); Holladay Order, supra note 253, at 30-35 (criticizing Drs.
Fisher and Norko).
261 Holladay Order, supra note 253, at 31, 35. In another case, the court used the
identical boilerplate but gave no reason for crediting the state's experts and discredit-
ing the defendant's experts. See Grayson Order, supra note 240, at 30 ("Further, this
Court credits the testimony of Dr. Harry McClaren, and does not credit the testimony
of Drs. Phillips and Zimmerman. Grayson is not entitled to relief.").
262 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 6 [hereinafter Magwood
Order], incorporated in Court's Order Denying Petition for Writ of Error Coram
Nobis, State v. Magwood, No. CC-81-303 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Houston County June 27,
1987), aff'd, 553 So. 2d 635 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 1989 Ala. LEXIS 966
(Dec. 1, 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
263 Weeks v. State, 568 So. 2d 864 app. at 868 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (reprinting
the Aug. 12, 1988 order of the Circuit Court of Macon County, denying Weeks's peti-
tion for a writ of error coram nobis), cert. denied, 1990 Ala. LEXIS 132 (Feb. 23,
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990).
The Weeks court did nothing to hide the ghostwritten nature of the order, merely
signing the document that the prosecutor submitted. The reprinted version appearing
in West Publishing's Southern Reporter begins with the heading "Respondent's Pro-
posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." Id. app. at 866.
264 Waldrop v. State, 523 So. 2d 475 app. at 481 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (reprinting
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the court finding him "experienced and capable." The orders also
included the percentage of the court-appointed lawyer's work devoted to
criminal defense cases and a finding that the lawyer "investigated" the
case by at least talking to the defendant and perhaps some witnesses.26 5
The "findings" then address specific issues regarding counsel's per-
formance, almost always concluding that whatever counsel did was "rea-
sonable and strategic" in order to insulate him from a finding of
ineffectiveness. For example, in the case of Arthur Lee Jones, whom Ala-
bama executed in 1986, the state court's ineffective assistance order con-
tained a finding that counsel's failure to give an opening statement, put
on any evidence about the defendant's life, and even to give a closing
argument on the issue of penalty were all "strategic" decisions.2  In
another case in which prosecutors used their jury strikes to eliminate all
African-Americans from the jury pool, the ghostwritten order found the
defense lawyers' failure to object to be "reasonable" and "strategic."" 7
In defending an African-American facing the death penalty for a crime
the July 28, 1986 order of the Circuit Court of Talladega County, denying Waldrop's
petition for a writ of error coram nobis), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
265 For examples of this oft-repeated litany, see Jones v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1292
app. at 1307-08 (S.D. Ala. 1984) (reprinting the December 12, 1984 order of the Cir-
cuit Court of Mobile County), aff'd, 772 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1073 (1986); Weeks, 568 So. 2d 864 app. at 868 (reprinting the Aug. 12, 1988
order of Circuit Court of Macon County); Harrell v. State, 526 So. 2d 646 app. at 652
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (reprinting the January 23, 1987 order of the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County, Besemer Division), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988); Bell v. State,
518 So. 2d 840, 844 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988);
Thomas v. State, 511 So. 2d 248, 251-52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Magwood Order,
supra note 262, at 6-7; Luke Order, supra note 246, at 1-3. This list is by no means
exhaustive.
266 See Jones, 599 F. Supp. 1292 app. at 1310 (citing Dec. 12, 1984 order of Circuit
Court of Mobile County); see also Baldwin v. State, 539 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988) (finding that counsel's "decision not to request a psychiatric examination
was a reasonable strategic decision which is not subject to second guessing"), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989); Horsley v. State, 527 So. 2d 1355, 1362 (Ala. Crim. App.
1988) (stating that counsels' "strategic decision not to pursue a psychiatric examina-
tion was made after an extensive investigation and is not to be second-guessed"), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989); Waldrop, 523 So. 2d 475 app. at 486 (citing July 28, 1986
order of the Circuit Court of Talladega County) ("Trial counsel's strategic decision
not to call witnesses is not subject to second guessing."); Bell, 518 So. 2d at 845 ("Trial
counsel's strategic decision not to call witnesses is not subject to second guessing.");
Jackson v. State, 501 So. 2d 542, 550 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("Trial counsel's strategic
decision not to call witnesses is not subject to second-guessing."), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1010 (1987); Coulter v. State, 494 So. 2d 895 app. at 903-04 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986) (reprinting the July 16, 1985 memorandum opinion of the Circuit Court of Col-
bert County) (labeling the petitioner's trial attorney's decision not to present mitigat-
ing evidence as "strategic").
267 See Magwood Order, supra note 262, at 9 (trial counsel's failure to challenge
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against a white person, it is difficult to imagine a reasonable strategy in
allowing the prosecutor to obtain an all-white jury. This is simply fiction
packaged by the state's advocate in the guise of a judicial finding.
In these and many other cases, state court judges repeatedly gave pros-
ecutors a blank check to say anything they wanted in proposed orders,
and then signed on the bottom line, converting advocate's briefs into judi-
cial orders. Regardless of what any court has said to the contrary,268 the
adoption of such orders has the appearance of impropriety and shows, at
the very least, not only lack of independence, but also complete indiffer-
ence on the part of many judges to what should be the most important
work of the judiciary.
E. Judges Acting as Prosecutors
The prosecution of high-proffle capital cases is often a stepping stone to
a judgeship, as has been described. Unfortunately, more than a few pros-
ecutors who become judges continue to prosecute from the bench.
Although they fail to discharge their responsibility to be neutral, disinter-
ested judges, they may continue to reap the same political benefits from
capital cases that they received as prosecutors.
In a recent Georgia capital trial, a sitting superior court judge took the
witness stand to tell the jury why, while serving as district attorney, he
had sought the death penalty and had refused to agree to a plea disposi-
tion in the case. 9 After testifying that the governor appointed him to
the bench after having "serve[d] the citizens of Hall and Dawson
count[ies] as their district attorney" for six years, 70 the judge summa-
rized the factors he had considered in making the decision as prosecutor
to seek the death penalty for Stephen Anthony Mobley:
[The defendant's] lack of remorse and a personality of "pure unadul-
terated meanness";
prosecutor's peremptory strike of all black jurors to get an all-white jury was a "rea-
sonable, strategic decision").
268 While courts have disapproved the practice of trial judges signing off on ghost-
written orders, see, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,
615 n.13 (1974); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4
(1964) (quoting J. SKELLY WRIGHT, THE NONJURY TRIAL- PREPARING FINDINGS OF
FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND OPINIONS, SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 159, 166 (1963)), they have nevertheless allowed
the practice, even deferring to findings of fact made in one-sided orders prepared by
advocates for one party, see, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985)
(refusing to reverse such findings unless shown to be clearly erroneous); Hubbard v.
State, 584 So. 2d 895, 900 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 584 So. 2d 895 (Ala. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1041 (1992); Morrison v. State, 551 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Ala.
Crim. App.), cert. denied, 551 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911 (1990).
269 Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 69-70 (Ga. 1995).
270 Id. at 71 n.1 (Hunstein, J., dissenting in part).
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The financial cost of death cases to taxpayers;
Discussion with the victim's family and their support for a death sen-
tence as the appropriate penalty;
Consideration of whether the "last minutes of [the victims'] lives
were more horrible to them than in other cases";
[The judge's] feeling that Mobley's description of the murder to [one
victim] was "unmerciful";
The strength of the State's evidence.2 7'
The judge summarized his decision by stating that "I've handled many
cases with heinous facts of a killing, but I have never, never seen a
defendant like Mr. Mobley." ' Remarkably, the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld Mobley's death sentence over the dissent of only a single
member.273
Edward D. Webster, a former prosecutor in Riverside, California, pub-
licly criticized a federal court of appeals for its decision in a capital case,
even though he is now the presiding superior court judge in Riverside.
Judge Webster, speaking "as a former prosecutor," expressed his "out-
rage" at a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit remanding a capital habeas corpus case on grounds that the fed-
eral district court had failed to provide funds for expert assistance in sup-
port of the habeas petition. 4 Judge Webster accused the federal court of
anti-death-penalty bias and called upon Congress to prevent all federal
courts except the Supreme Court from reviewing death-penalty cases. 275
A former prosecutor who now presides as a judge over capital cases in
Houston, Texas, William Harmon, stated to a defendant during a 1991
capital trial that he was doing "God's work" to see that the defendant was
271 Id. at 71-72.
272 Id. at 72.
273 Id. at 70. The Georgia Supreme Court had previously held in a pretrial appeal
in the case that the defendant could present evidence that he had offered to plead
guilty in mitigation of punishment. Mobley v. State, 426 S.E.2d 150 (Ga.) (appeal
after mistrial and before retrial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 198 (1993). The judge testi-
fied at the subsequent trial in response to evidence of Mobley's offer to plead guilty.
Upon review of the defendant's conviction and death sentence, and the consequences
of its earlier ruling, the court overruled its earlier decision and disapproved the admis-
sion of plea offers and the testimony regarding the rejection of such offers by counsel
in future cases. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 69-70. Nevertheless, a majority of the court
held that the judge's testimony in Mobley's case was not "inflammatory or highly
prejudicial," thereby allowing it to affirm the death sentence. Id. at 70; cf Brown v.
Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1988) (granting habeas corpus relief from a conviction
at a trial in which a Texas judge who was presiding over the case testified as the
prosecution's first witness).
274 Matthew Heffer, Judge Criticizes 9th Circuit for Death Penalty Decision, L.A.
DAILY J., July 31, 1995, at 1, 30.
275 Id. at 30.
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executed.276 In the same case, Judge Harmon taped a photograph of the
"hanging saloon" of Texas Judge Roy Bean on the front of the bench with
his own name superimposed over Judge Bean's, and referred to the
judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as "liberal bastards" and
"idiots." 277 In another capital case, Judge Harmon, upon a witness's sug-
gestion that some death row inmates should be transported to court,
stated, "Could we arrange for a van to blow up the bus on the way down
here?" '278 In another capital trial in 1994, Judge Harmon allowed the vic-
tim's father to yell obscenities at the defendant in the presence of jurors
and the press.279
These are among the more pronounced examples of judges who have
continued the prosecutorial role upon assuming the bench. Other judges
may be more sophisticated in understanding their role and more subtle in
their approach to capital cases.1 0 A judge does far more to undermine
the fairness of a trial and hasten the imposition of a death sentence by
appointing deficient counsel and in making discretionary rulings, as previ-
ously described, than by engaging in conduct such as Judge Harmon's.
It is not surprising that such judges are produced by a system that
rewards prosecutors for obtaining the death penalty by giving them the
public recognition and support needed to be elected judges. But this sys-
tem often does not produce judges who will be fair and impartial in capi-
tal cases. It is most difficult for a prosecutor who has made his name
prosecuting capital cases to refrain as a judge from further exploitation of
capital cases upon assuming the bench.
IV. REMEDIES FOR THE RESULTING LACK OF IMPARTIALITY
Elected judges are expected to "remain faithful to the values and senti-
ments of the people who elected them, and to render decisions using
common sense rather than newfangled legalisms. ' '211 But remaining
276 Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systematic Unfairness: The Texas Death Pen-
alty, 1973-1994, TEX. F. Civ. LiB. & Civ. RTS,, Spring 1994, at 1, 24.
277 Id. Judge Harmon was reprimanded for his conduct. Clay Robison, State Panel
Reprimands District Judge Harmon, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 1, 1993, at A29.
278 Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66, 78-79 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (granting writ of
habeas corpus).
279 Newton, supra note 276, at 24.
280 A description of how a judge can influence the course of a case by his tone,
body language, relations with counsel, and rulings on evidentiary points is provided in
the account of Judge William Callahan's handling of the trial of the "Scottsboro Boys"
in CARTER, supra note 32, at 274-302.
21 Comyn, supra note 90, at 374. Justice Comyn describes the forces that resulted
in an elected judiciary in that state. Id. (citing T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A
HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 435 (1983) ("No judge who had to run for
reelection regularly was expected to decide cases against the popular feeling, on some
new fangled point of law.")). Similar populist sentiments led to systems of elected
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faithful to popular sentiment is sometimes inconsistent with a judge's
duty to mete out equal justice and to enforce the Bill of Rights. As Jus-
tice Jackson wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assem-
bly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.2"2
Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben Overton has observed that it was
"never contemplated that the individual who has to protect our individual
rights would have to consider what decision would produce the most
votes." 28 The more a judge sees his or her fate as tied to community
sentiment, the greater temptation there is to "allocate justice in a manner
which conforms to community values and prejudices" '' and forget that
"[all of our people are entitled to equal justice under law."" 5 The diffi-
culty of ensuring both equal justice under law and the public perception
of a fair and independent judiciary when judges must stand for election
was described by Justice Comyn of the Texas Supreme Court:
Implicit in our national creed of "equal justice under law," and in
the public acceptance of the judicial function generally, is the idea
that judges are not respecters of differences of persons. But when
judges are required to be political animals, the hard decisions that
they are frequently called upon to make can too readily be cast as
essentially corrupt, and excoriated as payoffs to political constituen-
cies, instead of appearing to be the products of serious reflection and
lofty principle. If true, such conduct should be condemned in the
harshest terms. But if charges of political judging are false, our elec-
tive system can be viewed only as giving tacit credence to such an
accusation. 8
judges in other states. LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 3 (1980) (discussing the forces of change at
work in the 1830s and 1840s).
282 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
283 Electing Judges Is Poor Policy, Overton Tells Panel, supra note 138, at 4.
284 GEORGE F. COLE, POLITICS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 188-91
(1973).
2,85 Tom C. Clark, The Need for Judicial Reform, 48 WASH. L. REV. 806, 810 (1973).
Justice Clark wrote further: "We hear much about maintaining order, but before we
can attain it we must listen and respond to pleas for justice. History teaches us that
we will have neither order nor justice until we can attain both." Id.
286 Comyn, supra note 90, at 380.
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In contrast, federal judges have life tenure2 8 7 and are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate 21 in order to ensure
the independence of the judiciary and to guarantee that the courts will
perform their roles as protectors of "the rights of individuals. 2' 9 Recog-
nizing that "a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws"
was essential because "no man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow
the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be the gainer today,"
Alexander Hamilton wrote in the The Federalist No. 78: "That inflexible
and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individu-
als, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can
certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by tempo-
rary commission. ''29
1
The state bench also differs from the federal bench in that it is more
likely to be a stepping stone to a higher political office.292 In comparing
the state and federal judiciary, Chief Justice William Rehnquist has
pointed out that the life tenure of federal judges makes for a "different
kind of judge" than someone "looking out of one comer of his eye for the
287 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
288 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
289 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
290 Id. at 470.
291 Id. at 466 (stating also that "the complete independence of the courts of justice
is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at
483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) ("Every reason which recom-
mends the tenure of good behavior for judicial office militates against placing the
judiciary power, in the last resort, in 'a body composed of men chosen for a limited
period.' ").
292 For example, early in his career as a circuit judge in Alabama, George C. Wal-
lace, upon learning that federal officials were investigating underrepresentation of
African-Americans in jury pools in a Georgia county, proclaimed to an all-white
grand jury Bullock County, Alabama, that he would not allow the federal law-
enforcement officials to inspect his records. Wallace then called the Associated Press
to report this "news." BASS, supra note 33, at 185. Wallace later defied an order by
U.S. District Court Judge Frank Johnson to produce voting records and sought to be
held in contempt in order to benefit politically from a confrontation with the federal
court. Id. at 187-92.
In a more recent example, a state district judge in Texas announced her campaign
for attorney general by issuing a press release that said "a Valentine's Day capital
murder, which landed in her courtroom, compelled her to run for the office of attor-
ney general." Mark Horvit & Ken Herman, Politicians on Anti-Crime Bandwagon,
HOUSTON POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at A-25, A-27. Some politicians also move from other
state elective offices to the judiciary. For example, John Patterson, who defeated
George Wallace in the 1958 Alabama governor's race, and who defended segregation
as attorney general and governor, BASS, supra note 33, at 159, 185-86, is now a judge
on the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.
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next political opportunity that comes along."' 93 However, the politics of
crime have increasingly had an impact on nominations to the federal judi-
ciary294 and even the Supreme Court has seemed responsive to the polit-
ical potency of the crime issue.295
Nevertheless, although some appointees may take a political agenda
with them to the federal bench, life tenure still insulates judges from the
threat of being voted out of office for an unpopular decision. Every new
election reminds state judges of their vulnerability to popular sentiment.
Such constant reminders make it politically and practically impossible for
many judges to enforce the Constitution when doing so would be
unpopular.
If courts are to have integrity and credibility, judges must be selected,
evaluated, and assigned cases in a way that makes it possible for them to
uphold the law without imperiling their jobs. Political considerations will
always be a factor in the selection and promotion of judges in both the
state and federal courts, and some who become judges will allow their
personal prejudices to interfere with the faithful discharge of their duties,
regardless of how they are selected. But the selection and promotion
process should not allow a judge's ruling in a particular case to dominate
his or her prospects for remaining on the bench. If this is not the case,
judges will continue to work under unreasonable pressures and the public
will not view their decisions as fair, impartial, and legitimate. The
judiciary and bar should exercise leadership in bringing about the
replacement of judicial elections-both retention and contested-with
merit selection and periodic performance review. Although such systems
are desirable and may be more likely after elections that have signifi-
cantly diminished the standing of the courts in Alabama, California, Mis-
sissippi, Texas, and other states,2 96 one can expect that elections will
293 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Press Conference 5 (Mar. 15, 1989) (unofficial
transcript, on fie with Boston University Law Review).
294 Lewis, supra note 31, at A26. Other political issues have also come into play,
particularly with regard to nominations for the Supreme Court. See Cornyn, supra
note 90, at 367, 381-83 (observing how the "crusade between contending ideological
factions" on the issue of abortion has become a factor in nominations to the Supreme
Court).
29r See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting the "nationwide 'victim's rights' movement" in voting, after the retirement of
Justice Brennan, to overrule two recent 5-4 decisions, thus allowing victim-impact
evidence at the penalty phase of capital trials); id. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(expressing that it was a "tragedy" that such political pressures influenced the Court's
decision to take the case and to reach unnecessarily the constitutional question, and
even its substantive resolution of the constitutional issue).
296 Calls for new methods of judicial selection frequently come after elections or
other events that diminish the standing of the courts. See, e.g., Johnson & Urbis,
supra note 162, at 563-67 (calling for merit selection of judges in Texas to remedy the
problems caused by expensive judicial campaigns there); Norman Krivosha, Acquir-
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remain in many jurisdictions.
As long as judges are selected at the ballot box, several less effective
measures, small and large, should be taken to reduce the influence of
political considerations on judicial rulings. Judges must recognize their
constitutional and ethical responsibility to disqualify themselves in cases
in which one might reasonably question their impartiality due to political
pressures. Capital cases should be assigned to judges who do not face the
voters from the locality of the crime. The discretion of trial judges in
areas where they are under political pressures should be limited and
reviewing courts should give more careful scrutiny to rulings that are sus-
ceptible to influence by political considerations. Regardless of how
judges are selected, they should not appoint counsel for indigent defend-
ants. Removal of appointment responsibility from judges is necessary to
ensure the independence of the judiciary and the zealous defense of the
accused.
A. Using Diffuse and Indirect Citizen Input in Appointment and
Evaluation Systems
The elimination of direct and retention elections is a necessary step to
improve the fairness and impartiality of the judiciary. Eleven states and
the District of Columbia already employ systems in which judges never
face election.297 The systems in those states provide for removal of
judges only for misbehavior or other ethical improprieties,29 avoiding
the opportunity to turn a judicial election into a popular referendum on a
judge's rulings in controversial cases.
ing Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for Adopting Such a Method, 40
S.W. L.J. Special Issue May 1986, at 15, 20-21 (noting such a public call for "funda-
mental change in the way judges are selected in Illinois" after a Chicago scandal,
because of the lack of judicial independence and public perception that judges are not
impartial as a result of fundraising needed for campaigns); Do It Now, supra note 14,
at 32 (calling for reform of judicial selection system in Texas after the election of
Stephen Mansfield to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1994); Election Is a
Lousy Way to Chose State's Judges, GREENWOOD COMMONWEALTH (Miss.), Feb. 27,
1992, at 4 (criticizing the election of judges in Mississippi); Judicial Elections, CLAR-
ION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 7, 1990, at 14A (expressing the view that "electing
judges is a screwy way to decide who shall mete out justice" because "[i]t invites-
requires to some extent-partisan activity while it officially prohibits it"); Re-elect
Robertson; Stop Electing Judges, N.E. Miss. DAILY J., Mar. 6, 1992, at 8A (observing
that "men and women expected to impartially interpret the law sometimes become
embroiled in campaigns based on emotions and feelings that have nothing to do with
what the law clearly requires"); Supreme Court: State District Dispute Settled Now?,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), July 19, 1992, at 4G (expressing the view that
"Mississippi Supreme Court justices should not be selected on the whim of popular
politics, but on the basis of competence, demeanor and experience").
297 See supra note 83.
298 See provisions collected supra note 83.
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Although judicial elections appear to be immensely popular in the
United States, judges were not always selected and retained this way.
The American colonial governments utilized executive selection of judges
and service during good behavior in an effort to depoliticize the judiciary.
Resentment toward the Crown's control of the judiciary resulted in a shift
from judges serving at the pleasure of the executive2 99 to judges serving
during good behavior."°
Dissatisfaction with the appointed judiciary during the period of popu-
list Jacksonian democracy led to the election of judges.3 01 The public
viewed judges as too protective of the interests of property owners.
States began to adopt systems of electing judges in an effort to divorce
the judiciary from property owners.302 However, it became apparent that
popular election resulted in a highly politicized judiciary, with political
machines often controlling judges.3 03 States again began to tinker with
judicial selection methods, with some eventually adopting a selection plan
that included gubernatorial appointment from a list compiled by a judi-
cial selection committee, with a subsequent retention election after a cer-
tain period of time. 0 4 This reform sought to depoliticize the judiciary
and allow judges to make decisions unswayed by political considerations
while still allowing for some form of input from citizens."0 5 But, as has
been the case in California, Florida, and other places, even a retention
election can degenerate into a referendum on a judge's rulings in capital
or other controversial cases.306 Indeed, a strong argument can be made
that retention elections are even worse than direct elections where the
incumbent is challenged. In retention elections, there is no comparison to
299 Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U.
PA. L. REv. 1104, 1112 (1976) ("[I]t appears that by 1700 judges in the royal colonies
were commissioned uniformly during pleasure by the Governor on his own initiative
or upon warrant from the Crown.").
300 Id. at 1153-55 (cataloging the constitutional provisions of all original 13 states,
which provided for judicial tenure during good behavior, with some removal power in
the executive with consent of the legislature, and noting that all plans for a national
judiciary submitted at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 contained good-behav-
ior provisions).
301 BERKSON ET AL., supra note 281, at 3.
302 Id. at 4 (noting that by the time of the Civil War, 24 of 34 states had established
elected judiciaries and that as new states joined the Union, all adopted popular elec-
tions for some or all judges until the admission of Alaska in 1959).
303 Id. (discussing the perception of judges as corrupt).
304 Id. at 5-6 (discussing the advent of judicial selection commissions).
3o5 See SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERGSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELEC-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1980) (discussing the dual desire for judicial account-
ability and independence from public emotion).
306 For a review of this phenomenon in the 1986 California judicial elections, see
John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign,
the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
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be made among candidates. The judge standing for retention may be a
target for negative votes from various groups dissatisfied with decisions
on issues ranging from crime to abortion. Voters may want to express
their disapproval of the judge with no consideration of whether the
replacement judge will be any better.
The independence of the judiciary can be best preserved by a merit
selection system in which a bipartisan judicial qualifications commission
nominates a slate of qualified candidates to the executive, who then
nominates a judge subject to confirmation by at least one branch of the
state legislature."0 7 Meaningful citizen input can come by ensuring that a
substantial number of persons on the judicial qualifications commission
are not lawyers, but people who represent various segments of the public.
Such a system should provide for terms for judges of substantial length,
such as ten to fifteen years. Retention in office for additional terms
should depend upon an evaluation of the judge's performance by the
commission, not a retention election.
One state that employs such a system is Hawaii, where the governor
selects judges with the consent of the senate, from a list of nominees that
a judicial selection commission compiles.3 08 The judicial selection com-
mission's list must contain not less than six nominees.309 If a judge indi-
cates at least six months before the end of his term that he wishes
reappointment, the commission determines whether the judge should be
retained. 10 The primary purpose of the retention process is to "exclude
or, at least, reduce partisan political action. 3 11
There are many positive aspects to Hawaii's selection and retention
process. First, it provides for diffuse and indirect input in the judicial
selection and retention process by allowing the governor, the president of
the senate, and the speaker of the house of representatives, all of whom
are elected, to appoint a total of five members of the commission."1 2
Thus, there is public accountability in a selection process that provides a
layer of protection for judges who may make unpopular decisions.
Second, a judge serves a term of ten years, after which time the judicial
selection commission again evaluates and either retains or rejects the
307 For arguments supporting merit selection and criticizing the popular election of
judges as inconsistent with the duties and functions of a judge, see generally Krivosha,
supra note 296.
308 RAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 William S. Richardson, Judicial Independence: The Hawaii Experience, 2 HAw.
L. REv. 1, 47 (1979). Richardson was the Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court
when he wrote this article.
312 HAw. CONST. art. VI, § 4. The judicial commission consists of nine members in
all. Id. The chief justice of the supreme court and members in good standing of the
Hawaii bar each choose two of the remaining four members. Id.
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judge."' 3 Commission review allows an informed body to evaluate a
judge's entire ten-year record. The commission sees any unpopular or
controversial decisions in the context of a broader record. In addition,
the commission can review the legal reasons for the judge's decision, not
just the result.
Third, commission review avoids judicial electoral campaigns, some of
which can be demagogic, undignified, and unsophisticated. Judges create
complicated records of rulings on a variety of issues, and an informed
body representing the public can examine a judge's entire record rather
than merely focus on a judge's rulings in the most notorious or highly
publicized cases. Because a judge knows that an informed body will
review her performance, she will be less susceptible to community pres-
sures and will be more likely to enforce constitutional and statutory law.
Such a method of selection would also result in better judges. Many
capable and highly qualified individuals are unwilling to seek judgeships
where they must stand for election, knowing that the responsible dis-
charge of their duties in a controversial case could cost them their posi-
tions. Such individuals may also be unwilling to solicit campaign
contributions to finance a judicial campaign, knowing that it creates an
appearance of impropriety, 14 engage in campaign tactics that are incon-
sistent with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct but may be necessary to
313 HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3; see also D.C. CODE §§ 11-1501 to 11-1530 (1995)
(providing 15-year terms for judges in the District of Columbia with an independent
commission empowered to remove judges for cause).
314 Norman Krivosha, as Chief Justice of Nebraska, observed:
One may be the most ethical individual in the world and, yet, if one must seek
funds as the other two branches of government do when running for office, one
inevitably creates the appearance of impropriety.... How does a judge maintain
his or her appearance of impartiality and propriety if he or she is identified as a
"labor judge" or as a "management judge" or as a "plaintiff's judge" or as a
"defendant's judge?"
Another serious question is from whom are the funds to be solicited? Obvi-
ously, one must solicit from all lawyers practicing before the court. All lawyers,
obviously, want to contribute to the campaign of a sitting judge!
Krivosha, supra note 296, at 19-20; see also American Bar Ass'n, Report of Commis-
sion on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986) (finding that "many of the best
potential candidates [for a judgeship] never apply" in part because "[n]o matter how
hard a judge may try to be fair to contributors and non-contributors alike, the neces-
sity and the practicalities of campaign fundraising can only create the public expecta-
tion that judges will not be impartial"); Johnson & Urbis, supra note 162, at 540-42
(describing how fundraising has "seriously tarnished" the Texas judiciary's image
because the cost of a successful judicial campaign has "skyrocketed," potential candi-
dates have refused to seek judicial office, and the chief justice of the Texas Supreme
Court resigned in a show of support for a judicial selection system that would" 'take
the money out of judicial politics' ").
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obtain office, 15 or assume the bench knowing that they will be unable to
defend themselves when attacked politically for a single ruling or
decision.
Fourth, the public may have more confidence in and respect for the
judiciary because it knows that judges who do not have to worry about
offending a particular segment of the population in order to raise cam-
paign funds or stay in office are more likely to be impartial. At the same
time, periodic review of judicial behavior protects the public from those
who are unfit for judicial service.
Finally, and most importantly, such a system ensures that when an indi-
vidual takes the bench, he or she is independent in the sense that former
United States Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts described:
When a man goes on the Court he ought not to have to depend
upon the strength.., of his own character to resist the temptation to
shade a sentence in an opinion or shade a view. [He should not
have] to put an umbrella up in case it should rain. He ought to be
free to say his say, knowing as the founding fathers meant he should
know, that nothing could reach him and his conscience was as free as
could be. 16
To be independent, a judge must be free to disregard public sentiment
when required by the law, and to take unpopular, but constitutionally
mandated, action.
Until recently judicial elections, whether direct or retention, attracted
little public attention. Judges seldom encountered opposition either from
opponents or from interest groups opposing their retention. 17 However,
this is no longer the case. The judiciary in states all across the nation is
becoming increasingly politicized. The success in defeating incumbent
judges in some states is leading to new efforts in others. No judge can
risk alienating a powerful special interest group or being viewed as "soft
on crime." The elimination of both direct and retention elections is
essential if courts are to be responsive to the commands of the law and
Constitution instead of the will of the majority.
315 See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 327-28, 331, and
accompanying text.
316 Robert W. Raven, Does the Bar Have an Obligation to Help Ensure the Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary?, 69 JUDICATURE 66, 67 (1985) (quoting Justice Roberts).
317 Arthur Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualification and Selec-
tion, 36 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (1956) (observing that the only thing that had saved the
popular election of judges was the fact that most often judges were initially appointed
to fill a vacancy and then ran unopposed in subsequent elections);, see also JEROME R.
CORSI, JUDICIAL POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 112 (1984) (noting that "in the forty-
five-year history of retention elections [through 1980] .... only 1.6 percent of all
judges in retention elections were defeated"); Ross, supra note 120, at 166 (noting
that before 1986 appellate judges "had generally not been challenged and had
enjoyed job security because of public indifference to judicial elections").
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B. Judicial Disqualification When Rulings Could Imperil Election
In jurisdictions in which judges stand for election or retention, judges
should be disqualified from presiding over cases in which there is the
appearance that political considerations could tempt judges in their rul-
ings. The law of judicial disqualification and due process currently pro-
vides for this, but courts fail to apply this law properly, relying on fictions
of impartiality while ignoring political realities.
In Tumey v. Ohio,"'8 the Supreme Court held as violative of due pro-
cess a judicial system in which a mayor sat in judgment of alleged viola-
tors of a Prohibition ordinance, and was not paid unless he convicted and
fined at least some of those brought before him. The Court concluded
such a system deprives the accused of due process in several ways. First,
it "subjects [a defendant's] liberty or property to the judgment of a court
the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in
reaching a conclusion against him in his case." '19 Second, "It is certainly
not fair to each defendant, brought before the Mayor for the careful and
judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence, that the prospect of such a
loss by the Mayor should weigh against his acquittal." 20 Third, any sys-
tem that "offer[s] a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or [that]
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused, denies the latter due process." '' Fourth, given the
mayor's position, "might not a defendant with reason say that he feared
he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence from one who would have so
strong a motive to help his village by conviction and a heavy fine?" ' 2
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,"~ the Court extended the Tumey
principle to prohibit a mayor from acting as a judge in a case in which his
financial interest was not personal, but in which his general mayoral
responsibilities included revenue production .3  The Court rejected the
village's argument that this system does not deprive defendants of due
process because the mayor's decisions were correctable on appeal and
trial de novo in the County Court of Common Pleas. 2 5 Justice Brennan
wrote that "there is nothing to suggest that the incentive to convict would
be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal .... [The defend-
ant] is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance. ' 2 6
318 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
319 Id. at 523.
320 Id. at 532.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 533.
323 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
324 Id. at 60.
325 Id. at 61.
326 Id. at 61-62; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (holding
that an Alabama Supreme Court justice with a direct, personal, substantial, and pecu-
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The impartiality of judges who promise to be "tough on crime" is also
called into question by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3
provides that a judge "should not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism." '27 Canon 5 provides that a judge "shall not
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or] (ii) make state-
ments that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court.""s
The Tumey situation is analogous to a typical capital case tried,
appealed, or brought for postconviction review before an elected judge.
The justices of the Supreme Courts of California and Mississippi, the
judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and trial judges in Hous-
ton and other jurisdictions certainly know that their future on the courts
and their judicial salaries and pensions are closely related to their deci-
sions in capital cases. At the very least, these pressures create the
appearance of partiality:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness .... [T]o perform its high function in
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. 329
To take one example, a reasonable person has a basis for questioning
Alabama Circuit Judge Mike McCormick's impartiality in criminal cases
after he ran advertisements proclaiming: "Some complain that he's too
tough on criminals, AND HE IS . . . We need him now more than
ever." " Proclaiming that one is "too tough" on crime is incompatible
with holding "the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the
accused."3 31 Similarly, a reasonable person has a basis for doubting the
niary interest in the outcome of a case was barred from hearing the case); Dugan v.
Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (holding that a mayor acting as the judge did not deprive a
defendant of due process when the mayor received his salary regardless of whether he
convicted or acquitted the defendant, and when the mayor's connection to the general
fund from which he was paid was remote enough to preclude a presumption of bias).
327 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3B(2) (1990). For further discus-
sion of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and elected judges, see Ross, supra note
120, at 128-30 (applying the 1972 Model Code to the problem of elected judiciaries).
328 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5A(3)(d)(i), (ii) (1990).
329 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
3o Committee to Re-elect Judge Mike McCormick, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 4,
1994, at 4C (advertisement); Committee to Re-elect Judge Mike McCormick, BIR-
MINOHAM NEWS, Nov. 6, 1994, at 21P (advertisement).
331 Timey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). Not only did Judge McCormick's
proclamation suggest partiality, but it may in fact have been a violation of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judicial candidates, including incumbent
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impartiality of elected judges in Georgia's Flint Judicial Circuit,32 where
the prison where executions take place is a primary employer of voters,
especially when federal courts find the decisions of those judges to be in
error in three out of every four capital cases." 3
The legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the appearance of fair-
ness, and elected judges hearing capital cases too often make rulings that
appear to be patently unfair. It is apparent not only to Justice Stevens33 4
but also to those who observe the courts that judges are frequently
responding to a "higher authority" than the Constitution. In some
instances, that voice sounds too much like the cries of a lynch mob.
Tumey commands judges not have an improper temptation to rule in one
way or the other .33  A judge who will lose his position by ruling against
the prosecution in a single case is under far greater pressure not to "hold
the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused 3 6
than is a judge whose salary comes from fines that may be imposed in
some of the many cases that come before him. It is possible to construct
fictions of impartiality and impute them to every judge, but the reality is
that capital punishment is popular3 37 and judicial elections can become
referenda on the death penalty.
One step in the right direction would be to permit disqualification of at
least one judge without attempting to assess the question of impartiality.
For example, in Maryland, a party who believes that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had before the assigned judge may file a suggestion that
the judge is incapable of affording him or her an impartial trial and the
case must be removed to another court . 3  A judge in a capital case may
not refuse to grant the motion. This at least allows the defendant to
decide if the judge originally assigned to his case may not be in a position
judges, from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3B(2) (1990); see In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988) (censuring
a district judge for his campaign statements that he was "toughest on drunk driving,"
and "tough on drunk driving," because they singled out a special class of defendants
and suggest that the judge would subject those cases to a higher standard); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1444 (1980) (promise
to have a "strict sentencing philosophy" violates the Canon).
332 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
333 See supra note 206.
334 See supra text accompanying note 1.
335 See supra text accompanying notes 318-22.
336 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
337 See, e.g., Lynne Duke, In Arkansas, a Death Row Struggle and Doubt, WASH.
POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at Al, A8 (noting a recent Gallup Poll showing that 76% of Ameri-
cans support the death penalty); Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: A Capacity to
Change as Well as to Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, § 4, at 4 (noting polls
showing over 75% of people support the death penalty).
338 MD. RULES 4-254.
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to put aside political considerations, such as a judge facing a tough elec-
tion. This system is attractive because it does not operate on the pre-
sumption that judges become somehow immune to influences that would
weigh strongly on non-judges. This system does not attempt to discern a
judge's actual biases, but recognizes that the appearance of bias may
make it appropriate for another judge to hear the case. On the other
hand, when there is no concern about improper influences, the judge will
remain on the case. There is no assurance, however, that the new judge
assigned to a case will not also be facing a tough reelection campaign and
be subject to the same pressures.
It may be that practical considerations prevent courts from acknowl-
edging the appearance of partiality of elected judges due to political pres-
sures. If an entire state supreme court is disqualified, how is the case
decided? If a judge is disqualified from all criminal cases because he
promised to be "too tough on criminals,"" S how is the criminal docket to
be managed? The answer to these practical problems, however, is not to
substitute legal fictions for political reality.
The popular frustration regarding crime is making it increasingly diffi-
cult for courts to discharge their constitutional obligation of fairness.
Judges who realize they cannot hold the balance nice, clear, and true
between the state and the accused in particular cases because of political
considerations have a duty to recuse themselves. Lawyers have a duty to
move for the disqualification of judges who are subject to the temptation
to give in to political pressures in the cases before them. In reviewing
disqualification issues, trial and appellate courts should face the reality of
the political pressures that are present instead of hiding behind legal fic-
tions. If disqualification in cases in which one might reasonably question
judges' partiality due to political pressures begins to burden dockets, the
legislature and the bar will be forced to devise different selection systems
that will minimize the influence of political pressures on judges.
C. Altering Judicial Assignment Systems
One way to reduce the political pressures on elected judges is to pro-
hibit those judges from presiding over capital cases in the districts that
elect them. This could be accomplished through the judicial assignment
system.
For example, in both North 4 ' and South Carolina,"4' judges rotate
among judicial districts within the state. When out of his county of resi-
39 See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
340 N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (mandating the rotation of superior court judges
among various districts within a judicial division); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41 (1989)
(organizing the state into judicial divisions and superior court districts); id. § 7A-47.3
(1989) (implementing the constitutionally mandated rotation of superior court
judges).
341 S.C. CONST. art. V, § 10 (mandating the rotation throughout the state of all
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dence, the judge is relieved from the political pressure of having to por-
tray himself as the protector of his community; a judge would not
necessarily stand for election in the very place in which he had made
controversial rulings.
This system would help to diminish the role of political pressure on
judicial decisionmaking, but would not eliminate it. A judge could still
seek to impress the voters at home with his toughness in the case before
him in another district. In a highly publicized case, a controversial ruling
would still be well known and, even if it were not, an opponent could still
seize upon an unpopular but correct ruling and use it in opposing the
judge. Additionally, in any system a judge who intends to run for higher
office may want to use his or her position for visibility.
D. Limiting the Deference Reviewing Courts Give to Judges Influenced
by Political Pressures
So long as judges are subject to election or retention, the discretion of
trial judges on crucial matters should be limited by objective standards
that are carefully reviewed on appeal and in postconviction proceedings.
Reviewing courts should acknowledge the reality of the political pres-
sures on trial judges, and, where the potential for such influence is pres-
ent, they should carefully scrutinize rulings without the normal deference
accorded to trial judges.
Appellate courts routinely defer to findings of fact of state trial judges,
and review decisions of trial judges under the highly deferential abuse-of-
discretion and clearly-erroneous standards on critical issues such as grant-
ing of a change of venue, 42 allowing a continuance, 43 the extent and
circuit court judges); S.C. CODE ArN. § 14-3-390 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (implementing
the constitutionally mandated rotation of circuit court judges).
342 See, e.g., Parker v. State, 587 So. 2d 1072, 1080-81 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (find-
ing that a trial court's refusal to grant change of venue was not an abuse of discretion
even though 65 out of 93 members of the jury venire had prior knowledge of the
crime); People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 882 (Cal.) (declaring that in order to overrule
a trial court's decision not to change venue, "the defendant must show both that the
court erred in denying the change of venue motion, i.e., that at the time of the motion
it was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in the current county, and
that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that a fair trial was not in fact had"), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1016 (1991); Welch v. State, 229 S.E.2d 390, 395 (Ga. 1976) (holding that the
decision whether to grant a change of venue is within discretion of the trial court and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion).
343 See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 600 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("The deci-
sion to grant or deny a motion for continuance will not be reversed unless the trial
judge has abused his discretion."), aff'd in part and remanded, 600 So. 2d 1068 (Ala.
1992); People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 106 (Cal. 1991) (decision whether to grant con-
tinuance within discretion of trial court), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992); see also
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-22 (1990) (prescribing that all applications for continuances
are addressed to "sound legal discretion of the court"); Anderson v. State, 365 S.E.2d
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scope of voir dire, 3 " whether there has been racial discrimination in the
exercise of jury strikes,3 4 the impartiality of prospective jurors,34 and
421, 424 (Ga. 1988) (holding that a refusal to grant a continuance will be disturbed
only if "it clearly appears that the judge abused his discretion").
3" In most jurisdictions, the trial court determines whether jurors may be ques-
tioned individually or in a group and what questions may be asked. See, e.g., Mu'Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427-32 (1991) (upholding, as within discretion of the trial
judge, the conduct of mere limited, conclusory questioning regarding pretrial public-
ity); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (leaving within the discretion of the trial
court the form and number of questions regarding racial prejudices to be asked of
prospective jurors, including whether the venire is questioned individually or collec-
tively); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474, 484 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (stating that the
decision whether to grant voir dire individually or collectively is within discretion of
trial court), aff'd sub nom. Ex parte Kuenzel, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 886 (1991); see also Hill v. State, 427 S.E.2d 770, 773 (Ga.) (finding no abuse of
discretion when a trial court remained in session until 11:00 p.m. on the first day of
voir dire but adjourned between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m. on the remaining days), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 396 (1993).
M5 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) (concluding that the trial
judge's findings regarding a prosecutor's reasons for striking jurors who are members
of cognizable class are subject to "great deference"); Daniel v. State, 623 So. 2d 438,
442 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (repeating that a trial court is entitled to "great defer-
ence" in ruling on Batson claims; reversal was required only if a trial court's determi-
nation is clearly erroneous); Lingo v. State, 437 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. 1993) (applying
Batson's requirement of "great deference" to uphold the trial court's findings that a
prosecutor had racially neutral reasons for exercise of all 11 peremptory strikes
against the first 11 African-American venire members called).
346 A trial court finding of juror impartiality may be overturned only for "manifest
error." Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 428; Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984); see also
Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 521 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (stating that the trial
court's ruling on challenges for cause based on pretrial knowledge of the case will not
be disturbed on appeal unless clearly shown to be an abuse of discretion), aff'd, Ex
parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993), aff'd, Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031
(1995); Sheperd v. State, 325 So. 2d 551, 555-56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975) (finding that
the decision of whether a juror could be impartial despite a friendship with an assis-
tant district attorney is within discretion of the trial court), cert. denied, 325 So. 2d 557
(Ala. 1976); Hittson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 586, 594 (Ga. 1994) (stating that the trial
court's findings regarding venire members' capability to serve as impartial jurors are
entitled to deference on appeal), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2005 (1995); Ledford v. State,
439 S.E.2d 917, 922 (Ga. 1994) (stating that an appellate court defers to trial court's
findings that jurors could be impartial despite equivocation on question of whether
they would automatically impose death penalty), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 740 (1995);
Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (repeating that
whether a juror should be stricken for cause is within discretion of the trial court),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1338 (1994); Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 681-82 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992) (discussing the need for deference to trial court's rulings with respect to
juror impartiality), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3046 (1993).
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the admission of certain types of evidence. 47 Federal courts, when
reviewing state court judgments in habeas corpus proceedings, are
required to give a presumption of correctness to findings of fact by the
state courts.348 The notion that the trial judge, having observed the
demeanor of the witnesses and heard all of the evidence first hand, is in a
better position to make determination of credibility forms much of the
basis for the deference accorded the trial judge. 349 This deference also
rests upon the prevailing legal fiction that assumes the impartiality of
judges.
In reality, however, political considerations may be more important
than legal principles or the demeanor of witnesses. As previously dis-
cussed, judges are under immense political pressure in making discretion-
ary rulings in high-profile capital cases. A classic example is the case of
Sheppard v. Maxwell. 50 The murder trial of Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard
started, after extensive pretrial publicity, just two weeks before a Novem-
ber election in which the chief prosecutor was a candidate for judge and
the trial judge was a candidate for reelection.35' The Supreme Court held
that Sheppard was entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court
had failed to protect his right to a fair trial by taking measures such as
continuing the case until after the election, changing venue, and control-
ling the trial participants' release of prejudicial information to the
press.3 52
347 See, e.g., Hart v. State, 612 So. 2d 520, 528 (Ala. Crim. App.) ("The decision to
receive photographs into evidence is within the discretion of the trial court."), aff'd,
612 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2450 (1993); Haney v. State, 603 So.
2d 368, 396 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that the admission of "gruesome and
ghastly" photos is within discretion of trial court); People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 377
(Cal. 1991) (upholding the admission of autopsy photographs in the absence of "mani-
fest abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1062 (1992); Capehart v. State, 583
So. 2d 1009, 1012-13 (Fla. 1991) (stating that the decision whether to qualify expert
and permit expert testimony is within the discretion of trial court), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1065 (1992); Taylor v. State, 640 So. 2d 1127, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) ("A trial
court's rulings with regard to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence ... are sub-
ject to an abuse of discretion standard of review."), review denied, 649 So. 2d 235
(Fla. 1994).
348 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426-35 (1985)
(holding that a trial court's finding that a venireperson is disqualified due to views on
the death penalty are subject to presumption of correctness); Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (holding that a trial judge's finding that jurors were impartial
despite pretrial publicity is entitled to a presumption of correctness).
349 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (holding great deference to the trial judge
appropriate because the decision regarding exclusion of jurors "largely will turn on
evaluation of credibility").
350 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
351 Id. at 342.
352 Id. at 358-63; see also Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir.
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Unfortunately, since Sheppard, the Supreme Court has not mandated
procedures to minimize the risk of prejudice in such volatile situations or
required careful scrutiny based on objective standards of similar discre-
tionary decisions by trial judges."' 3 The Court has also retreated from its
earlier pronouncements that because of the exceptional and irrevocable
nature of the death penalty, capital cases require a heightened degree of
procedural protection.3 5
4
A few state supreme courts have recognized the political pressures on
trial judges and have fashioned more objective standards and mandatory
procedures to reduce the discretion of trial judges in making rulings that
may be politically unpopular. For example, the Mississippi Supreme
Court, after acknowledging the political pressures that may influence a
judge's decision on whether to grant a change of venue, decided that
"some objective standards should be available to shield the [trial] court
1952) (holding that a trial court erred when it refused to continue a case that had
become a hot political issue until after an election).
353 See, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (upholding the denial of indi-
vidual voir dire in a capital case even when pretrial publicity was pervasive and con-
tained prejudicial details about the crime and the defendant's criminal history);
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (holding that a trial court did not commit "man-
ifest error" in finding the jury as a whole impartial despite pretrial publicity and in
denying challenges for cause of jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity).
354 For examples of the earlier pronouncements, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has required
"extraordinary measures" to ensure the reliability of decisions regarding both guilt
and punishment in a capital trial); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980)
(prohibiting the state from withdrawing from the jury the option to hear a lesser-
included-offense instruction in capital cases because to do so "introduces a level of
uncertainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a
capital case"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (recognizing that the "quali-
tative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of relia-
bility when the death sentence is imposed" and holding that a capital defendant has a
constitutional right to offer any aspect of his or her "character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense" as a mitigating factor warranting a sentence less
than death); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (holding that it is of
"vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose
death be, and appear to be, based on reason rather that caprice or emotion"); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (observing that death "is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment" and that "[b]ecause of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the deter-
mination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"). Justice Black-
mun observed the Court's retreat from this approach in his dissenting opinion in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987): "The Court today seems to give a new
meaning to our recognition that death is different.... [and] relies on the very fact that
this is a case involving capital punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 347-48 (dissenting opinion).
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from even the appearance of such subtle coercion. '3 55
The Mississippi Supreme Court described the political reality for
elected trial judges in considering a motion to change venue:
[B]y perennially holding that a change of venue is granted solely at
the discretion of the court, we perpetuate a burden on the trial judge.
On the one hand, the judge is to act impartially, dispassionately and
with scrupulous objectivity. On the other hand, in reality, the judge
serves at the will of the citizenry of the district; the judge is, after all,
a public official who must occasionally, perhaps even subconsciously,
respond to public sentiment when making the decision to refuse a
change of venue. It must be observed that, in granting a change, the
trial judge might be perceived as implying that a fair trial cannot be
had among his or her constituents and neighbors.356
To keep such sentiment from influencing the judge, the court held that
the accused has a right to a change of venue when it is doubtful that
an impartial jury can be obtained; such doubt is implicit when there
is present strong public sentiment against the defendant; upon
proper application, there arises a presumption that such sentiment
exists; and, the state then bears the burden of rebutting that
presumption.5 7
The court also emphasized the importance of fairness in capital cases:
A heightened standard of review is employed on appeal where the
defendant's life is at stake .... It follows then that the trial court
should, likewise, be particularly sensitive to the need for a change of
venue in capital cases.35 8
The Georgia Supreme Court also modified its standard of review of
denials of motions for a change to venue and directed trial judges in
Georgia to grant changes of venue when a capital defendant makes "a
substantive showing of the likelihood of prejudice by reason of public-
ity.' 's59 The Court rejected the argument of the dissent that the determi-
nation of the trial judge was subject to "special deference" and should not
be overturned unless it was "manifestly erroneous. 3 60
355 Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1209 (Miss. 1985).
356 Id.
357 Id. 1210-11. In applying the standard in the case before it, the court found that
the state could not rebut the presumption of community prejudice in light of the testi-
mony of 15 witnesses regarding specific reasons that the defendant could not receive a
fair trial in the community. Id. at 1213.
358 Id. at 1214; see also Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 220-23 (Miss. 1985) (apply-
ing the Johnson presumption and holding that the trial judge abused his discretion by
not granting a change of venue in a case in which every juror had been exposed to
extensive negative pretrial publicity).
359 Jones v. State, 409 S.E.2d 642, 643 (Ga. 1991).
360 Id. at 644 (Hunt, J., dissenting). This had been the court's approach in previous
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Venue decisions are but one example of potential for the influence of
improper political considerations on judicial rulings and the need for
reviewing courts to remedy politically influenced decisions by adopting
and applying objective standards. Where a particularly notorious crime
produces volumes of publicity, that publicity often creates pressure on the
judge to score political points. The more objective standards that the
Supreme Courts of Mississippi and Georgia have adopted lessen the dis-
cretion allowed the trial judge, and allow courts a greater distance from
the political influences to review trial decisions."' 1 A reviewing court can
examine the testimony, the newspaper articles, and the tapes of broad-
casts and make its own determination of whether there is a "likelihood of
prejudice"" 2 or the prosecution has rebutted a defendant's showing that
public sentiment makes the likelihood of an impartial jury doubtful."o
Although these decisions of the Supreme Courts of Georgia and Mis-
sissippi providing for greater protection of the rights of the accused than
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court may appear encouraging, they
say more about the retreat of the U.S. Supreme Court from protecting
the rights of the accused than it does about the willingness-or political
practicality-of the state courts upholding the Constitution in these situa-
tions.a 4 Most courts have shown little inclination to face reality with
regard to many other discretionary decisions of trial judges that political
considerations may influence. Decisions recognizing the political pres-
sures on elected judges and adopting and applying more objective stan-
dards to limit discretion are the rare exceptions to thousands of decisions
routinely deferring to decisions by trial judges on a wide range of issues.
The deference in federal habeas corpus actions to state court factfind-
cases. See, e.g., Isaacs v. State, 386 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032
(1990); Devier v. State, 323 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985).
361 Of course, where a case has generated statewide publicity and community sen-
timent, see, e.g., supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text, or when the state supreme
court's handling of all capital cases has become a political issue, as in California, the
greater distance will still not free the state appellate courts from political influences.
Moreover, because of the political consequences of an unpopular decision at either
level, elected judges on both the trial and appellate benches may not fairly and con-
sistently apply any objective standard that is established. Therefore, more objective
standards are only a small interim step until judicial selection systems can be
reformed along the lines discussed supra part IV.A.
362 Jones, 409 S.E.2d at 643.
363 Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1210-11 (Miss. 1985).
364 The two decisions discussed are quite fragile. The composition of the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court has changed because of the opposition of prosecutors to such
modest steps toward fairness. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. The
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Jones was by a 4-3 vote over a vigorous dissent
by Chief Justice Hunt. 409 S.E.2d at 644. The Georgia Attorney General has already
accused one of the court's justices, who faces election in 1996, of leading an effort to
abolish the state's death penalty. See supra note 208.
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ing,365 as well as other increasingly severe restrictions on habeas
review,36 6 insulate many decisions by state courts from federal review.
Nevertheless, a reexamination of the deference given to elected judges
on discretionary matters is urgently needed. The outcomes of the judicial
elections in California, Texas, Mississippi, and other states discussed in
this Article are exposing for all to see the political pressures that influ-
ence the decisions of judges who face election or retention. It is of course
impossible to know the number of judges who simply give in, either con-
sciously or subconsciously, to their political pressures or the number of
judicial rulings and opinions that political considerations influence. But
the political realities are apparent to anyone who practices in the courts
and observes these pressures at work. In many of the jurisdictions where
the death penalty is frequently imposed, the political reality is that the
elected state court judge cannot even consider granting relief to one fac-
ing the death penalty.
If judges continue to be voted off trial and appellate courts for their
decisions in capital cases and are replaced with judges who are little more
that conductors on railroads to the execution chambers, it will be impossi-
ble for courts to maintain the fiction that judges who face election are
impartial without risking public ridicule and immense damage to the per-
ception of the legitimacy and credibility of the courts. Until more funda-
mental reform of judicial selection is feasible, courts must acknowledge
and deal with the political pressures on judges. In addition, full federal
habeas corpus review of state court convictions should be restored. The
once Great Writ of habeas corpus barely survives the blows that have
rained upon it from the efforts of the Supreme Court and the Congress to
expedite executions, achieve finality, and reduce friction between the
state and federal courts.3 67 Yet as numerous examples set out in this
Article make clear, 36 only federal judges have the independence and job
365 See authority collected supra note 348.
366 See cases collected supra note 44.
367 See supra note 44; see also Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (decrying "the allure of faddish modernity,
of a stop-watch style of jurisprudence" and the trading away of the "most precious
legacy of Lord Coke, the power to discharge from custody even one imprisoned by
order of the King" for "a mess of pottage, a gruel composed of questionable notions
of efficiency and vague notions of federalism"); Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1160-
62 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (expressing the view that the "pleth-
ora of statutory and judicial procedural barriers" that have obstructed access to fed-
eral habeas corpus review "profoundly regrettable"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
368 See especially supra notes 196-201, 205-06, 208 and accompanying text. Even
with the development of many procedural barriers to federal habeas corpus review,
federal courts found constitutional error in 40% of the first 361 capital judgements
reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings between the restoration of the death penalty
in 1976 and mid-1991. Liebman, supra note 44, at 541 n.15. In some states, such as
Georgia, the percentage has been much higher. See supra note 206. Thus, state court
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security that enable them to enforce the protections of the Constitution
when doing so would be vastly unpopular. If the Constitution is to serve
its purpose as fundamental law that protects us from "our baser selves"
when there is "a demand for vengeance on the part of many persons in
the community against one who is convicted of a particularly offensive
act," '69 its enforcers must be judges who cannot be swept from office for
making a controversial decision.
E. Appointment of Counsel Independent of Judges
Regardless of how judges are selected, they should not be responsible
for the appointment of counsel for poor persons accused of crimes. An
independent judiciary should be independent not only of political influ-
ences and the prosecution, but also of the defense. Judges have a differ-
ent role to play in the adversary system than the management of the
defense. In addition, defense counsel should be independent of the judge
in order to fulfill the obligation of providing zealous representation to the
accused.
The American Bar Association recommends that there be a defender
office or a special appointments committee to select counsel for indigent
defendants.37 0 Removing the responsibility for the representation of
defendants from judges and placing it with a program charged with pro-
tecting only the best interests of the defendants"' will not completely
depoliticize the process or always ensure adequate counsel, but it would
be an important step toward a properly working adversary system and
effective representation of indigent defendants.
CONCLUSION
Justice Hugo Black once observed that "[u]nder our constitutional sys-
tem, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for
judges-at both the trial and appellate level-failed to correct constitutional error in
at least 40% of the capital cases. It is impossible to know how many other constitu-
tional errors were barred from federal review. It is remarkable that with such a dis-
mal track record, it would be seriously contended that the elected state court judges
will enforce the Constitution in such controversial cases.
369 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 344-45 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
370 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORM-
ANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 3.1 (1989); see also Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n, supra note 42, at 19, 254.
371 Such programs must not only be charged with responsibility for providing zeal-
ous representation to the accused; the governing boards and staffs must be made up of
people who understand and are committed to the defense function in the adversary
system. Cf. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Mandela to Mthwana: Providing Counsel to
the Unrepresented Accused in South Africa, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1995) (sug-
gesting the same as a partial remedy for the lack of adequate representation in post-
Apartheid South Africa).
1995]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:759
those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, out-
numbered, or because they are ... victims of prejudice and public excite-
ment."3 72 This role is of particular importance in capital cases, where the
winds of public excitement blow especially hard against the poor, mem-
bers of racial minorities, and the despised who stand accused of heinous
crimes. Judges are not legislators; they have a different role than simply
carrying out the wishes of their constituents to impose the death penalty.
Capital cases put extraordinary pressures on all participants in the legal
system. Even the most conscientious and independent judge faces an
enormous challenge of reining in the emotions that accompany a brutal
crime and the loss of innocent life. If decisions about guilt and pun-
ishment are to be made fairly, objectively, and reliably, 73 it is critical
that judges be guided by the Constitution, not personal political
considerations.
Yet in high-visibility capital cases in which public opinion is over-
whelmingly one-sided though often ill-informed, the political pressures
may be so great that a judge who has an interest in remaining on the
bench cannot ignore them. In today's political climate, a commitment to
fairness is too often perceived as "softness" on crime-a political liability
for a judge who must run for office. The lack of electorial clout of those
facing the death penalty makes the political equation easy; however, the
cost to justice and the rule of law is significant.
Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that even the most modest proposals
discussed in this Article will be implemented in many jurisdictions-par-
ticularly those where they are most urgently needed-in the near future.
In part, this is because there are many people who prefer judges who
follow the election returns to judges who follow the law. It is also partly
because the judiciary and the bar persist in hiding behind the legal fiction
that judges are impartial instead of acknowledging the reality that in
many instances they are not. The U.S. Supreme Court indulges in wishful
thinking about what the state courts should be, instead of facing what
they are, including the political pressures on those judges.
It is, however, time for open and honest discussion of the political pres-
sures on judges who must stand for election and retention. The integrity,
credibility, and legitimacy of the courts are at stake. Judges themselves
should lead the discussion by disqualifying themselves sua sponte from
cases in which they recognize that political considerations may keep them
from holding the balance "nice, clear and true. 3, 7 4 But it may be neces-
sary for lawyers to prompt the discussion by filing motions for recusal in
cases in which such pressures are present. The judiciary and the bar have
372 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
373 A "fundamental idea" of due process is that life is not to be "forfeited as capital
punishment" unless the case is "fairly tried in a public tribunal free from prejudice,
passion, excitement, and tyrannical power." Id. at 236-37.
a74 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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a duty to explain to the public the difference between the representative
function of legislative bodies and the adjudicatory function of courts.
These steps are urgently needed to bring about reforms that will increase
the likelihood that the only "higher authority" to which judges are
responsive is the Constitution and laws of the United States.

